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THE PROBLEMS WITH DONOR INTENT: INTERPRETATION,
ENFORCEMENT, AND DOING THE RIGHT THING
SUSAN N. GARY*
INTRODUCTION
Recent cases involving donor restrictions on charitable gifts have
made headlines. Robertson v. Princeton settled on December 8, 2008, after
six years of litigation during which both sides argued their interpretations
of the donor's intent. A Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, court ruled
that the Barnes Museum can move to downtown Philadelphia, despite the
donor's directions that the art be left in the building designed to house it. In
a case involving the Buck Trust, a court refused to apply cy pres because,
said the court, it had to protect donor intent. The court then modified the
trust in ways the donor probably did not intend. After unprecedented dona-
tions to the Red Cross in the aftermath of September 11, politicians accused
the Red Cross of failing to follow donor intent with respect to those contri-
butions, and the Red Cross changed its plans for the use of the funds. Most
recently, Brandeis University announced that it would close the Rose Art
Museum and sell the artwork, only to back off after family members of the
donors pointed out the donor restrictions on gifts creating the museum and
providing the artwork.
* Orlando J. and Marian H. Hollis Professor of Law, University of Oregon. An early version of
this paper was prepared for Grasping the Nettle - Respecting Donor Intent and Avoiding the "Dead
Hand", Annual Conference of the National Center on Philanthropy and the Law, New York University
School of Law (New York City, October 27-28, 2005), and benefited from comments from the partici-
pants at that conference. I would like to extend special thanks to Nancy A. McLaughlin who com-
mented on this paper at the symposium, The Law of Philanthropy in the Twenty-First Century, and
provided me with extensive comments after the symposium. I also owe a significant debt to my research
assistants, Ryan Flatley and Amanda Seclos, for their help in gathering materials and helping me formu-
late ideas for the earlier version of this paper and to Grady Goodall for assisting with the current ver-
sion. Finally, I would like to thank Fred Hopengarten, a relative of Edward and Bertha Rose, for sharing
information about the Rose Art Museum and the family's suit against Brandeis.
CHICAGO-KENT LA WREVIEW
In each of these high profile cases, as in many other reported cases,1
one side or the other, and usually both, based their arguments on donor
intent. The difficulty, of course, is that in most of these cases, the donor
was dead at the time the controversy began, and no one really knew what
the donor intended at the time of the gift or would have intended had the
donor known about the changed circumstances. 2 Written documentation for
the gifts exists in all but the Red Cross controversy, but the written docu-
ments have not prevented legal wrangling over what the charity should do
in the face of changed circumstances.
A question then is whether the lawyers who work with donors and
charities can and should do a better job of helping those clients draft chari-
table gift agreements that reduce the likelihood of future problems. A sec-
ond question is whether when a disagreement arises, the charity and family
members of the donor can resolve the dispute in a way that honors the in-
tent of the donor while taking changes that have occurred since the gift was
made into consideration. And a third question is how the law should ad-
dress donor restrictions and changes that occur over time.
This article will start with short descriptions of the five cases de-
scribed above, to illuminate the problems faced by those who would pin
down donor intent. The article then explains the legal duty to give effect to
donor intent and notes the self-interested reasons charities usually want to
give effect to donor intent. The article then discusses four circumstances
under which donor intent may be difficult to determine and identifies prob-
lems that can arise over time. The article also describes the legal rules that
permit a donor and charity to agree to modify a restriction in certain situa-
tions and the rules that allow a court to modify a restriction under other,
limited, circumstances. A court modification depends on the distinction
between cy pres, used to modify a restriction on the purpose of a gift, and
deviation, used to modify a restriction on how the charity carries out the
1. See, e.g., Hood v. Maddox Found., No. Civ.A. 2:04CV347-P-B, 2005 WL 1669024 (N.D.
Miss. 2005) (attempt to move foundation may be counter to donors' implicit intent to benefit Tennessee
charities); Howard v. Adm'rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 986 So. 2d 47 (La. 2008) (Tulane closed Sophie
Newcomb College and donor's descendants sued to enforce condition or revoke gift); In re Milton
Hershey Sch., 867 A.2d 674 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005), rev'd, 911 A.2d 1258 (Pa. 2006) (cy pres and
diversification issues); Georgia O'Keeffe Found. v. Fisk Univ., No. M2008-00723-COA-R3-CV, 2009
WL 2047376 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (sale of paintings to cover financial difficulties).
2. Donor intent depends on documentation at the time of the gift and not thoughts about what a
donor might have intended under changed circumstances, but the discussion of donor intent often
includes thoughts about later intent as well as intent at the time of the gift. The doctrine of cy pres
directs the court to modify a gift "in a manner consistent with the settlor's charitable purposes." UNIF.
TRUST CODE § 413(a)(3) (2004) (amended 2005). The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. d
(2003) explains, "In framing a scheme for the application of property cy pres, the court will consider
evidence suggesting what the wishes of the settlor probably would have been if the circumstances had
been anticipated."
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purpose. Cy pres changes the intent of the donor, while deviation permits a
change that will help a charity carry out the donor's intent. As the five
cases demonstrate, this distinction can affect the outcome of a case in
which a charity requests a modification. The article concludes by consider-
ing options available to donors, considerations for lawyers drafting gift
restrictions, and cautionary recommendations for donors, charities, and
lawyers who might try to pin things down too tightly or try to draft inten-
tionally ambiguous, as opposed to flexible, gift agreements.
II. FIVE EXAMPLES
A. Robertson v. Princeton
Both sides, 3 and many commentators, 4 have characterized Robertson
v. Princeton5 as a donor-intent case. The difficulty was, not surprisingly,
that the two sides had different views of what the donor intended. The set-
tlement of the case recognized that the plaintiffs and defendants had differ-
ent understandings of the donor's intent and provided that Princeton would
manage some of the funds in keeping with its interpretation of the donor's
intent and that the Robertson family would manage other funds in keeping
with their interpretation of the donor's intent.6
In 1961, Marie Robertson-or Marie and Charles Robertson, depend-
ing on who is writing about the gift7-gave $35 million to Princeton Uni-
3. Victoria Bjorklund, one of the lawyers representing Princeton, wrote that the case should be
characterized as an academic freedom case, rather than a case focused on donor intent. She also dis-
cusses donor intent and explains that the University followed the donor's intent with respect to the gift.
See Victoria B. Bjorklund, Robertson v. Princeton - Perspective and Context 3,
http://www.princeton.edu/robertson/documents/docs/NonprofitForum.pdf (Jan. 2008).
4. See Posting of Darryll K. Jones to Nonprofit Law Prof Blog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/nonprofit/ (July 15, 2008) (stating that Robertson v. Princeton "has
been termed the most import donor intent lawsuit ever to face the nonprofit community .... ").
5. Robertson v. Princeton Univ., No. C-99-02 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. filed Jul. 17, 2002).
6. See Settlement Agreement,
http://www.princeton.edu/robertson/documents/docs/Robertson SettlementAgreement-Executed.pdf
(last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
7. It appears that Marie Robertson was the legal donor of the Robertson Foundation. Marie was
heir to the A&P grocery fortune, and the A&P stock used to make the gift was held in her name. Her
husband, Charles, played an active role in negotiating the terms of the gift and was involved in the
foundation from the time of the gift until his death. See Robertson Lawsuit - Background,
http://www.princeton.edu/robertson/about/background (last visited Feb. 17, 2010); Charles Robertson,
Charles Robertson's December 15, 1960 Notes Contemplating an Expanded Woodrow Wilson School,
Dec. 15, 1960 http://www.princeton.edu/robertson/documents/docs/Charles- Robertson-12-15-
60_notes.pdf. At the time of the gift, Jack Myers wrote a memo for Princeton President Robert Goheen
detailing a discussion Myers had had with Mr. Hatfield, assistant director of the Tax Rulings Division
of the IRS. The letter from Myers to Goheen refers to "Mrs. Robertson's proposed gift," and then the
memo states "We advised Mr. Hatfield that in fact Mr. Robertson had virtually given up to Princeton
every right except the right to witness his money being spend [sic] and an opportunity to speak with
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versity to support the graduate program of the Woodrow Wilson School at
Princeton. Mrs. Robertson8 and Princeton agreed to create a separate or-
ganization, called the Robertson Foundation, to hold the assets. The terms
of the agreement appear in the Certificate of Incorporation and the Bylaws
for the Robertson Foundation.9 The terms include restrictions imposed on
the use of the gift and a management structure that assured control of the
foundation by Princeton.' 0
The donor's decision to make the gift through a separate organization
controlled by Princeton appears to balance two concerns. By using the
foundation rather than giving the money directly to Princeton, the donor's
family would continue to oversee the use of the gift. And by giving Prince-
ton control over the foundation, the donor would be able to obtain deduc-
tions for gift and income tax purposes. 11 Princeton agreed to the structure,
probably for two reasons as well. Princeton needed to control the gift in
order to be able to make the financial commitments necessary to carry out
the plans the Robertsons and Princeton had in mind-a substantial expan-
sion of the graduate program at the Woodrow Wilson School. Princeton
planned to hire new faculty and make other long-term arrangements based
on the gift, and the university needed assurance that it would control the
respect to operation (but not to exercise any control)." Memorandum from Jack Myers on Princeton
Control of Foundation (and the Gift Generally) (May 4, 1961) (on file at
http://www.princeton.edu/robertsondocuments/docs/John Myers.memo_5-4-61 .pdf) [hereinafter
Myers Memorandum]. The default in 1961 was probably to think about a gift of this magnitude as a gift
from a man, and Charles may have taken a leading role in negotiating the agreement with Princeton.
Princeton documents from the time of the lawsuit consistently refer to Mrs. Robertson as the donor. See
Bjorklund, supra note 3, at 4, 8, 16. Comments from the Robertson family describe the gift as a gift
from Charles and Marie Robertson. See Complaint at 2, Robertson v. Princeton Univ., No. C-99-02
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. filed Jul. 17, 2002) (on file with author); Press Release, Regarding Amended
Complaint (June 2004) (on file with author). The Memorandum in Support of the Settlement Agree-
ment, agreed to by both sides, states: "Marie Robertson made the generous gift in 1961 (facilitated by
her husband Charles Robertson, a Princeton alumnus with strong ties to and affection for the Univer-
sity)." Memorandum of Law in Support of the Parties' Joint Motion on Consent Seeking the Court's
Approval of Settlement Agreement and Dismissal of Action with Prejudice and Without Costs at 2,
Robertson v. Princeton Univ., No. C-99-02 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. filed Jul. 17, 2002),
http://www.princeton.edu/robertson/documents/docs/Memo ofLaw-Settlement.pdf [hereinafter Set-
tlement Memorandum]. This statement seems to best capture the situation at the time of the gift.
8. In this article I will refer to Mrs. Robertson as the donor, and I acknowledge that Charles
Robertson played a significant role in establishing and running the Robertson Foundation.
9. See Robertson Foundation Certificate of Incorporation (as amended through Jul. 26, 1961),
http://www.princeton.edu/robertson/documents/docs/Robertson-Foundation -Certificate of Incorporati
on.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2009); Robertson Foundation Bylaws,
http://www.princeton.edu/robertson/documents/docs/Robertson-Foundation-By-laws.pdf (last visited
Feb. 1. 2009).
10. See Robertson Foundation Certificate of Incorporation, supra note 9 at 1; Robertson Founda-
tion Bylaws, supra note 9 at 1, 3.
11. See Myers Memorandum, supra note 7, at 1-2 (describing attempts to persuade Mr. Hatfield
at the Internal Revenue Service that the Robertsons should obtain both income and gift tax deductions
because Princeton controlled the foundation).
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use of the money. 12 Princeton probably also was happy to have the Robert-
sons involved. Charles and Marie were supportive of the school, and
Princeton likely welcomed the continuing involvement of the family. And,
of course, the Robertsons' agreement to make the gift may have depended
on Princeton's willingness to accept the foundation structure. As with most
significant gifts, the success of the gift depends on both parties finding the
terms of the gift satisfactory. 13 In the case of the Robertson Foundation,
everyone seemed pleased with the structure. 
14
The Robertson Foundation's Certificate of Incorporation provides that
the foundation will have seven directors, states that the members of the
foundation will be the directors, and adds that the directors will be called
trustees. 15 The Bylaws explain that the organization will have seven mem-
bers: four "Princeton members" and three "family members."' 16 Three of
the Princeton members are the persons holding the following positions:
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Trustees of Princeton Univer-
sity, the President of the University, and Chairman of the Finance Commit-
tee of the Trustees of Princeton. 17 The President of the University appoints
the fourth Princeton member.' 8 The Bylaws provide that Charles and Marie
Robertson will appoint the three Family Members, and after the deaths of
12. See Letter from Robert F. Goheen, President of Princeton University, to the Comm'r of the
Internal Revenue Service (May 1, 1961) (on file at
http://www.princeton.edu/robertson/documents/docs/PresGoheen_letter_5-1-61 tothe-IRS.pdf)
("[T]he prospective donor has fully understood and agreed that the University must have the responsi-
bility for the direction, maintenance and operation of the [Woodrow Wilson] School in all its aspects.");
see also Charles Robertson's August 20, 1970 Notification to IRS Concerning Foundation Status,
http://www.princeton.edu/robertson/documents/docs/Notification -Conceming-Foundation-Status-8-
20-70.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2009). The notification, filed by Charles Robertson as President of the
Robertson Foundation, states that the foundation is not a private foundation because it is controlled by
Princeton. An attachment explains that Princeton required the control in order to "undertake the long
term commitment involved in the project." The attachment adds that the donors agreed, "and the Cer-
tificate of Incorporation and By-laws were accordingly drawn to give Princeton permanent control of
the Board of Trustees." See id.
13. See Bjorklund, supra note 3, at 3 ("[T]he terms governing this generous gift were not unilater-
ally dictated by the donor. Instead, the terms were the product of extensive negotiations between the
Robertson Family and Princeton University, and their mutual agreement is ultimately set forth in the
Foundation's Certificate of Incorporation.").
14. In a 1977 letter to John Gardner, first Chairman of the Advisory Committee of the Robertson
Foundation, Charles Robertson urged Mr. Gardner to return as a member of the committee and noted
that "[t]he Woodrow Wilson School is first rate" and that he "never had cause for regret" that he and
Marie had supported the school through the Robertson Foundation. See Letter from Charles Robertson
to John Gardner (Jan. 8, 1977), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/robertson/documents/docs/Charles-Robertson_1-8-
77_letter toJohn_Gardner.pdf.
15. Certificate of Incorporation, supra note 9, at 2.
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Charles and Marie, their descendants have that power.19 Charles served as
Chairman of the Board of Trustees from the creation of the foundation until
his death, twenty years later.
20
The Certificate of Incorporation states the objective of the Robertson
Foundation and the purposes for which the foundation's assets may be
used. 21 The purpose restrictions are both detailed and broad, and the two
sides have used different sections of the purpose statement to argue over
whether Princeton followed the restrictions. Princeton argued strenuously
that the document defines its obligations and that it had complied with the
restrictions.22 The Robertson family argued that Princeton had failed to
follow the intent of the donor, using narrow language in describing that
intent.23 Each side had a different view of what the donor intended.
In 2002, members of the Robertson family24 filed suit against Prince-
ton University, the four Princeton trustees, and the Robertson Foundation,25
arguing that Princeton had failed to follow the mission of the Robertson
19. Id.
20. See Robertson Lawsuit - Background, supra note 7.
21. See Certificate of Incorporation, supra note 9, at 1:
This corporation is organized and shall be operated exclusively for charitable, scientific, liter-
ary, or educational purposes and for no other purpose. In furtherance of such purposes its ob-
jective is to strengthen the Government of the United States and increase its ability and
determination to defend and extend freedom throughout the world by improving the facilities
for the training and education of men and women for government service and to contribute,
lend, pay over, or assign the income of the corporation and/or the funds or property of the
corporation (any payments of principal being subject to the limitations of article 11 (c) hereof)
to or for the use of Princeton University for any one or more or all of the following uses:
(a) To establish or maintain and support at Princeton University, and as part of the
Woodrow Wilson School, a Graduate School, where men and women dedicated to public
service may prepare themselves for careers in government service, with particular em-
phasis on the education of such persons for careers in those areas of the Federal Gov-
ernment that are concerned with international relations and affairs;
(b) To establish and maintain scholarships or fellowships, which will provide full, or par-
tial support to students admitted to such Graduate School, whether such students are can-
didates for degrees, special students, or part-time students;
(c) To provide collateral and auxiliary services, plans and programs in furtherance of the
object and purpose, above set forth, including but without limitation, internship pro-
grams, plans for public service assignments of faculty or administrative personnel, mid-
career study help, and programs for foreign students or officials training.
22. See Letter from Robert K. Durkee, Vice President and Secretary of Princeton University, to




23. See William Robertson, Letter to the Editor, For Charities, It's a Matter of Trust, THE STAR-
LEDGER (Newark N.J.), Jul. 22, 2008, at 13.
24. Plaintiffs were four children of Marie and Charles--William Robertson, Anne Meier, Kathe-
rine Ernst, and John Robertson-and a cousin, Robert Halligan. John Robertson died during the lawsuit.
William Robertson, Katherine Ernst, and Robert Halligan served as the three family-member trustees at
the time the suit began. See Complaint, supra note 7.
25. See id.
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Foundation "to support the government of the United States and for that
purpose to maintain and operate, at Princeton University, as part of the
Woodrow Wilson School, a graduate school to train young men and
women for careers in government service, particularly international rela-
tions and affairs."'26 The Original Complaint requested that the court de-
clare that the Robertson Foundation documents prohibited using PRINCO
for investment management, substitute a different university for Princeton,
and require Princeton repay to the foundation amounts improperly paid by
the foundation. 27 Two years later the plaintiffs filed an Amended Com-
plaint asking the court to modify the Certificate of Incorporation of the
Robertson Foundation, changing the foundation into a private foundation
controlled by Robertson family members and removing Princeton's control
over the foundation.
28
Princeton countered that, in its view, a charity should honor the agree-
ments it made with a donor and that Princeton had done just that with re-
spect to Mrs. Robertson's gift.29 Robert K. Durkee, Vice-President and
Secretary of Princeton, wrote, "it is the descendants of the donor, not
Princeton University, who are trying to overturn the donor's intent through
an expensive lawsuit and public relations campaign." 30 Echoing this senti-
ment, a statement released by Princeton after the case settled described the
lawsuit as brought by "members of the Robertson family who sought to
seize control of the Robertson Foundation's funds and redirect them to
purposes other than the purpose agreed to by the donor and the University
in 1961 .... -"31 Princeton noted that the Robertsons' request that the foun-
dation be turned over to them ran counter to the donor's decision to entrust
the gift to Princeton. 32
After six years of legal fighting, the Robertson Foundation and Prince-
ton settled the suit.33 The Memorandum of Law filed with the court ex-
26. See id. at 2.
27. See id. at 5.
28. First Amended Complaint at 5, Robertson v. Princeton Univ., No. C-99-02 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div.) (on file with author).
29. See Robert K. Durkee, Letter to the Editor, Princeton Seeks to Honor Intent, USA TODAY,
June 5, 2008, at 9A.
30. Id.
31. Settlement Retains Princeton's Control, Use of Robertson Funds,
http://www.princeton.edu/robertson/statements/viewstory.xml?storypath=/main/news/archive/S
2 2 /81/6
6C43/index.xml (last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
32. Id.
33. Final Judgment and Order of Dismissal, Robertson v. Princeton Univ., No C-99-02 (N.J.





plained that the settlement "will achieve three critical goals - furthering the
charitable objectives as agreed upon by the Robertson Family and Prince-
ton in 1961, obtaining finality, and avoiding further burdensome litigation
and trial." '34
Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the Robertson Foundation will
be dissolved and its assets transferred to Princeton to be held by Princeton
as the Robertson Fund.35 Princeton will hold the Robertson Fund as a sepa-
rate endowment fund and will use the fund "to further the object and pur-
pose set forth in the Robertson Foundation's Certificate of Incorporation, as
understood and interpreted solely by Princeton. '36 Princeton will pay, from
the assets of the Robertson Fund or from other sources, the sum of $50
million to the Robertson Foundation for Government, Inc. (RFGI),37 a pri-
vate foundation created by the Robertson family plaintiffs during the litiga-
tion. The new foundation's "object and purpose mirrors the object and
purpose of the Robertson Foundation, as understood and interpreted by
plaintiffs. ' 38 The settlement stipulates that the funds be held under this
restriction. 39 Princeton also agreed to pay $40 million, from the Robertson
Fund or other sources to reimburse the Banbury Foundation for legal costs
incurred in connection with the lawsuit.40 The Robertson family controls
the Banbury Foundation, and the plaintiffs had used assets of that founda-
tion to pay their legal expenses. 41 The end result of the settlement is that
most of the Robertson funds will continue to be used for the purposes Mrs.
Robertson intended, but two different organizations-Princeton and
34. Settlement Memorandum, supra note 7.
35. Settlement Agreement, supra note 6, at 5.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 6.
38. Settlement Memorandum, supra note 7, at 2.
39. See id. at 6-8; Settlement Agreement, supra note 6, at 8.
40. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 6, at 8.
41. The Banbury Fund is a private foundation controlled by William Robertson, his sisters and the
sister's spouses. See Bjorklund, supra note 3, at 21-22. Ms. Bjorklund found no statement of charitable
purpose in any publicly available documents (the organization had no website and its Form 990 did not
describe its charitable purpose). Ms. Bjorklund raised the issue of whether William Robertson and his
sisters, all of whom are officers of the Banbury Fund and plaintiffs in the Princeton litigation, engaged
in self-dealing when they used Banbury Fund assets to pay their legal expenses in the lawsuit against
Princeton. Id. An article in The Chronicle of Philanthropy quotes Charles Robertson as writing, "The
Banbury Fund is specifically dedicated to support the purpose of the Robertson Foundation," and the
article says that the Robertsons got a legal opinion that the spending was okay. Ben Gose, Family Uses
Nonprofit Funds to Pay Legal Expenses in Princeton U. Case, THE CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHROPY,
Oct. 24, 2007, http://www.ncrp.org/news-room/news-2007/185-family-uses-nonprofit-funds-to-pay-
legal-expenses-in-princeton-u-case (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). Nonetheless, Aaron Dorfman, executive
director of the National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy, describes the use of Banbury Funds to
pay the legal expenses as "yet another egregious example of people abusing philanthropy for personal
gain." Id.
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RFGI-will interpret her intent. All other payments associated with the
settlement will also be dedicated to charitable purposes, and no further
litigation expenses will reduce money otherwise available for charitable
purposes.
B. The Barnes Foundation
Dr. Albert Barnes created the Barnes Foundation in 1922 as an educa-
tional institution that would train students in Dr. Barnes's theories of art
aesthetics. 42 The trust indenture, charter and bylaws creating the Founda-
tion imposed many restrictions, including a requirement that the art he con-
veyed to the trust be displayed in the building he had built to house the art,
hung exactly as it was when he died.43 The art could not be moved, sold, or
lent to other museums.44 The gallery was to be open to the public on an
extremely limited basis, and fees were prohibited.45 Successor trustees
were to be five representatives appointed by Lincoln University, a small,
historically black college located in nearby Chester, Pennsylvania.
46
A panoply of problems developed in connection with the Barnes
Foundation.47 The gallery gradually opened its doors to the public, causing
traffic problems in the suburb of Merion where Dr. Barnes had built the
gallery. The resulting lawsuits with neighbors in Merion may have contrib-
uted to the financial woes of the Barnes Foundation.48 With limited ability
42. See The Barnes Foundation Bylaws, art. IX, para. 29,
http://www.barneswatch.org/mainjbylaws.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2010) ("[A]rt gallery is founded as
an educational experiment under the principles of modern psychology as applied to education, and it is
Donor's desire during his lifetime, and that of his wife, to perfect the plan so that it shall be operative
for the spread of the principles of democracy and education after the death of Donor and his wife."); see
also JOHN ANDERSON, ART HELD HOSTAGE: THE BATTLE OVER THE BARNES (2003); Chris Abbinante,
Comment, Protecting "Donor Intent" in Charitable Foundations: Wayward Trusteeship and the Bar-
nes Foundation, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 665, 666-74 (1997) (describing Dr. Barnes, the circumstances
surrounding the creation of the Foundation, and the history of the Foundation's troubles); liana H.
Eisenstein, Comment, Keeping Charity in Charitable Trust Law: The Barnes Foundation and the Case
for Consideration of Public Interest in Administration of Charitable Trusts, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1747,
1749-50 (2003); About the Barnes Foundation, http://www.barnesfoundation.orgh_main.html (last
visited Feb. 3, 2009) (describing the influence of John Dewey and others on Dr. Barnes' views of
education).
43. See Barnes Foundation Bylaws, supra note 42, art. IX, para. 13; Abbinante, supra note 42, at
671-72.
44. See Barnes Foundation Bylaws, supra note 42, art. IX, para. 10.
45. Id. paras. 29, 30.
46. Id. para. 17.
47. See Jeffrey Toobin, Battle for the Barnes: Can One of America's Greatest Private Collections
Survive?, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 21, 2002, at 34 (detailing the many legal battles).
48. See, e.g., Barnes Found. v. Twp. of Lower Merion, No. CIV.A 96-372, 1999 WL 1065213
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 1999); see also Barnes Found. v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 242 F.3d 151 (3d Cir.
2001) (alleging that defendants had acted to oppose the expansion of museum operations as part of a
2010]
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to raise money to cover operating expenses, the trustees of the Foundation
pursued a series of requests that the court modify the restrictions Dr. Bar-
nes had imposed.49 Over the years the Foundation was permitted to in-
crease the hours it was open to the public, to hold fundraising events in the
gallery, and to take part of the art collection on a world tour to raise money
for the Foundation.50 The changes kept the Foundation financially viable
for awhile, but by 1998 the Foundation found itself in dire financial
straits. 51 A consortium of Philadelphia charities agreed to provide financial
assistance to the Foundation, but only if the Foundation agreed to obtain
modifications permitting it to move the gallery to downtown Philadelphia;
to lift restrictions on public access and social gatherings; to enlarge the
board of trustees to fifteen, with Lincoln University appointing only four
(thereby giving up control); and to provide that in the future, the bylaws
could be amended by the trustees rather than through the court.52
The Foundation sought and received court approval to make these
changes. 53 The decision to move the Barnes gallery to downtown Philadel-
phia will address many of the problems surrounding the Barnes Founda-
tion, but the modifications clearly conflict with donor intent.54 Indeed the
organizations brokering the deal were the sort of mainline organizations
and interests Dr. Barnes despised. 55 The court side-stepped the intent issue
conspiracy to violate foundation's constitutional rights because of the race of some of its trustees. All
claims were eventually dismissed).
49. See In re Barnes Found., 684 A.2d 123, 124-28 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (detailing a series of
lawsuits involving the Barnes Foundation).
50. See id. at 126.
51. See Eisenstein, supra note 42, at 1751-52.
52. Id. at 1752-53.
53. In re Barnes Foundation, No. 58,788, 2004 WL 2903655, at *20-*21 (Pa. Ct. of Common
Pleas Dec. 13, 2004); see also Heinrich Schweizer, Settlor's Intent Vs. Trustee's Will: The Barnes
Foundation Case, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 63, 65 (2005).
54. See William Schwartz & Francis J. Serbaroli, After the Barnes Ruling: What Donors Should
Do to Protect Their Wishes, THE CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHROPY, March 31, 2005 (noting that the ruling
to permit the Barnes Foundation to move is "[p]erhaps the strongest reason donors have been given to
worry" about whether charities will carry out their wishes); see also Leslie Lenkowsky, In the Fray: A
Risky End to the Barnes Case, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Dec. 16, 2004, at D8. Julian Bond, a civil rights
activist and NAACP chairman, whose father was president of Lincoln University at the times Barnes
wrote his indenture, said, "When power speaks, institutions are likely to crumble and lose. In this case,
tourism trumped Albert Barnes's trust, and the accumulated interests of Philadelphia's wealth and
might and political power broke Albert Barnes's intention." Lita Solis-Cohen, Camp to Leave Barnes,
MAINE ANTIQUE DIGEST, available at http://www.barnesfriends.org/downlload/news-camp-leave-
barnes.pdf.
55. See ANDERSON, supra note 42, at 29, 219. Dr. Barnes wanted to make the art collection
accessible to working-class people. The Indenture provides that "men and women who gain their liveli-
hood by daily toil in shops, factories, schools, stores and similar places, shall have free access to the art
gallery and the arboretum upon those days when the gallery and the arboretum are to be open to the
public...." Barnes Foundation Bylaws, supra note 42, art. IX, para. 30. The Indenture also makes
clear that Dr. Barnes does not want the Foundation to come under the control of mainstream academics.
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by basing its decision on deviation rather than cy pres. Whether Dr. Barnes
considered the directions concerning the location of the art part of his pur-
pose restrictions or only administrative restrictions remains, and will for-
ever remain, uncertain.
An organization called Friends of the Barnes Foundation continues to
protest the move to Philadelphia, 56 and in 2008 Montgomery County and
the Friends of the Barnes-art students, alumni, and neighbors of the mu-
seum-asked the judge to reopen the case.57 On May 15, 2008, the judge
denied standing and dismissed the petition.58 The plaintiffs have said they
will not appeal that ruling, 59 and the move to downtown Philadelphia now
seems inevitable. 60
C. The Buck Trust
In the Buck Trust, changed circumstances affected the trustee's ability
to carry out the terms of the trust. In 1975 Beryl Buck created a trust under
her will to provide for the needy of Main County, California. She named
the San Francisco Foundation the trustee and funded the trust with stock
worth $7 million. Due to unexpected changes in the value of the stock, the
trust assets increased in value to $400 million in only ten years.61 The San
Francisco Foundation became concerned that limiting the use of the trust to
Main County, the wealthiest of the five counties that make up San Fran-
cisco, would threaten the integrity of its work in the other four counties it
served.62 The Foundation sought court approval to permit distributions in
all five counties. 63 The court denied the Foundation's request and ex-
pressed dismay that the Foundation would suggest changing the donor's
It states, "no Trustee shall be a member of the faculty or Board of Trustees or Directors of the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, Temple University, Bryn Mawr, Haverford or Swarthmore Colleges, or Pennsyl-
vania Academy of the Fine Arts." Id. art. IX, para. 17.
56. The Friends of the Barnes Foundation website still says, "It's not too late to STOP THE
MOVE ... Friends of the Barnes Foundation, http://www.bamesfriends.org/ (last visited Feb. 19,
2010).
57. Posting of Amaris Elliott-Engel to The Legal Intelligencer Blog,
http://thelegalintelligencer.typepad.com/tli/ (Jun. 17, 2008 10:58 EST).
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. Construction of the new building began with a ceremony on October 16, 2008. The Barnes
Foundation Announces New Building on Benjamin Franklin Parkway to be Complete by 2011,
http://www.barnesfoundation.org/v-pr_-101608.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
61. Mark Sidel, Law, Philanthropy and Social Class: Variance Power and the Battle for American
Giving, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1145, 1177 (2003).
62. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 744 (7th ed. 2005).




intent by expanding the geographical reach of the trust to five counties in
the San Francisco area, altering Mrs. Buck's direction that the money be
spent only in Marin County. 64 The court determined that a change in where
the trust spent its funds would require the application of cy pres, and the
direction to spend the money in Main County did not reach the impossibil-
ity threshold required for cy pres. The court then made other changes to the
Buck Trust, including designating certain charities as beneficiaries of the
income of the trust.65 The court described these changes as administrative.
As John Simon points out, however, the changes the court imposed may
have done more damage to Mrs. Buck's intent than the geographical
change would have done. 66 Would Mrs. Buck have considered the geo-
graphic restriction a purpose restriction rather than an administrative re-
striction? And would Mrs. Buck have considered the change in trustee a
mere administrative change and not a violation of her intent with respect to
the purposes of the trust? Further, would Mrs. Buck have insisted that the
trust be used entirely in Main County had she known about the dramatic
change in value? Determining donor intent on these facts seems impossible,
therefore; describing the court's decision as one made in conformity with
donor intent seems inapposite.
67
D. The Red Cross and September 11
Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, contributions
poured into the Red Cross and other funds created specifically for victims
of the attacks. 68 The story of the Red Cross and the September 11 contribu-
tions provides interesting commentary on the role of donor intent in the use
of charitable gifts. Perceived donor intent became a key factor in the use of
chaitable funds, undermining legal rules that normally apply to distribu-
tions by disaster relief charities. Politicians and talk show hosts pressured
the Red Cross to spend all of the funds received in response to the Septem-
64. See id.; see also Aaron Wildavsky, Exchange Versus Grants: The Buck Case as a Struggle
Between Equal Opportunity and Equal Results, 22 U.S.F.L. REV. 841, 850 (1988) (reproducing the
statement Mr. Wildavsky made in opposition to the petition for cy pres, in which he concludes, "I
cannot see the rationale in taking the radical action of rejecting the donor's intent [that all the money be
spent in Main County]").
65. See Thompson, supra note 63, at 691-92.
66. See John G. Simon, American Philanthropy and the Buck Trust, 21 U.S.F.L. REv. 641, 666-
68 (1987).
67. See id.; Harvey P. Dale, The Buck Trust 7, 11 (1987), at
http://www.nyu.edu/projects/hdale/buck%20Trust%20Article%20by%2OHPD%20_1987-.pdf.
68. See Stephanie Strom, Families Fret as Charities Hold a Billion Dollars in 9/11 Aid, N.Y.
TIMES, June 23, 2002, at 29. [hereinafter "Families Fret"]. The totals received were between $2 billion
and $3 billion, and the Red Cross alone received $997.1 million. Id.
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ber 11 attack directly on victims of September 1 1 because, they said, the
donors intended that result.69 In retrospect, 70 it seems likely that donor
intent was more complicated.
Special rules in charity law govern the use of funds collected by disas-
ter-relief organizations. A charitable fund created for victims of a disaster
may provide for the needs of the victims of that disaster and still have
money left over. A charity can distribute money for a variety of purposes
related to a disaster, without regard to the financial needs of the recipient,
because victims of a disaster typically have immediate needs for food and
shelter that do not depend on a victim's general financial situation. How-
ever, once the charity meets the immediate needs of a disaster's victims,
the charity cannot simply make outright payments to victims, regardless of
financial need.71 An individual can give money to a person without concern
for financial need, but a charity cannot. Thus, a charity may accomplish the
tasks for which the funds were contributed-providing for the immediate
needs of victims of the disaster-without exhausting the money contrib-
uted.
Several legal options exist for surplus funds held by a disaster relief
charity. 72 If the donor's intent was limited to a purpose that has been com-
pleted, the surplus funds will be treated as a resulting trust and will revert
to the donor.73 Usually a court will find that the donor intended that the gift
remain in the charitable stream and not be returned to the donor. Federal
tax law favors this approach because the donor will not be entitled to a
charitable deduction to the extent that any surplus could be returned to the
donor.74 Assuming that a resulting trust is not applied, the options for the
surplus are: (1) to use the surplus for a related purpose, through the doc-
trine of cy pres; (2) to let the same charity use the surplus for another of its
purposes; or (3) to transfer the surplus to a private trust to be distributed to
the same beneficiaries who benefited from the charitable trust.75 Courts
have occasionally taken the third option and permitted the distribution of
69. See infra text accompanying notes 88-90.
70. Of course, most analysis is easier in hindsight, and the extreme emotions surrounding Septem-
ber 11 make this particular case atypical. Yet, the manner in which politicians and others employed
donor intent as an argument provides useful insights.
71. See Robert A. Katz, A Pig in a Python: How the Charitable Response to September 1] Over-
whelmed the Law of Disaster Relief 36 IND. L. REV. 251, 266-70 (2003) (explaining why and under
what circumstances disaster relief qualifies as a charitable activity).
72. For a detailed explanation of the law governing the disposition of surplus disaster relief funds,
see id. at 272-84.
73. For information on resulting trusts, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 7 (2003).
74. See Katz, supra note 71, at 278.
75. See id. at 272-75; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 8, cmt. g, § 67.
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surplus to victims of the disaster. 76 More commonly, a charity is permitted
to use a surplus for other purposes of the charity. 77 The courts reach this
answer by making assumptions about a donor's intent. If the donor contrib-
uted to a particular charity, then the donor would likely want that charity to
use any surplus for its other purposes. If a donor intends some other result,
then the donor will have to indicate that preference when making the gift.
78
The legal rules that have developed for disaster relief organizations
generally permit the organizations to use surplus funds for future disasters.
Disaster relief organizations need to be able to respond quickly when a
disaster occurs, and building a reserve to use for future disasters allows an
organization to mobilize quickly. Allocating surplus funds to future disas-
ters also allows an organization to provide its services more equitably be-
cause some disasters draw more donations than others.
79
The donors sending money to the Red Cross in those first anguished
days following September 11 did not sign gift agreements and did not send
written instructions about the use of the money. They may have responded
to public service announcements created by the Red Cross, but many do-
nors probably simply wanted to do anything to help following the tragedy.
Donors likely thought of the Red Cross as an appropriate recipient due to
the longstanding role of the Red Cross in responding to disasters.
Prior to September 11, in keeping with the legal rules applicable to
disaster-relief organizations, the Red Cross had used money not needed for
a particular disaster to fund future needs. 80 The Red Cross intended to do
the same thing with funds raised following September 11, but the lack of
public understanding of the legal rules combined with the Red Cross's lack
of clarity about its plans led to controversy.
After September 11, Red Cross solicitations sent mixed messages.
Some Red Cross solicitations asked for funds for "those affected by this
and other disasters" while other solicitations focused more on responding
to the September 1 1 attack. 81 Initially, funds received by the Red Cross
following September 11 went into the Red Cross's Disaster Relief Fund, a
fund used to respond to all disaster relief operations. 82 Then, on September
20, the Red Cross announced the creation of a separate fund, the Liberty
76. See, e.g., Doyle v. Whalen, 32 A. 1022 (Me. 1895); see also Katz, supra note 71, at 274-75.
77. See Katz, supra note 71, at 274.
78. Id, at 276-77.
79. See id. at 304-305.
80. See id. at 303-05.
81. Id. at 306-07.
82. See id. at 303-06 (explaining the history of the American Red Cross and the manner in which
it used donations prior to September 11).
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Fund, to hold all contributions it received following September 11, whether
or not the donor had specifically restricted the contribution for use in con-
nection with September 11.83 A memorandum posted on the Red Cross
website explained the creation of the fund and that the fund would be used
to support Red Cross responses to future terrorist attacks as well as to aid
victims of September 1 1.84 The Red Cross did not otherwise publicize the
broad purposes of the fund, and given later events, it appears that few peo-
ple paid attention to the statement on the website.
On October 30, the Red Cross announced that it was ending solicita-
tion of donations for the Liberty Fund.85 In the same press release, the Red
Cross explained its intention to hold some of the funds contributed as a
reserve for future terrorist attacks.86 The announcement "drew immediate
criticism." 87
Subsequent arguments about the use of the fund focused on the per-
ceived intent of donors88 and ignored other legal rules applicable to chari-
table funds, including rules applicable to surplus funds collected by disaster
relief organizations. Many of those involved in the public controversy
found donor intent unequivocal. The Attorney General of New York, Eliot
Spitzer, announced, "I'm of the belief that most individuals, if not all indi-
viduals, who made contributions in the aftermath of Sept. 1 1 fully expect
those contributions to benefit those affected by Sept. 11."89 Congressman
Charles F. Bass dismissed any suggestion that a statement of the broad
purposes of the Liberty Fund should control donor intent, saying, "[y]ou
know that if you asked Americans where they thought the money was go-
83. Id. at 307-09.
84. See id.
85. See David Barstow & Katharine Q. Seelye, Red Cross Halts Collections for Terror Victims,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2001, at BI 1.
86. See id. In announcing the creation of a reserve fund for surplus funds collected, the Red Cross
was simply following its usual procedures-and the law. The manner of the announcement, and the fact
that legal reasons for this use of the surplus were not explained, probably did not help the position of
the Red Cross. Nonetheless, the fact that the attorney general of New York, charged with understanding
and administering the law, criticized the plans of the Red Cross, suggests that politics and perceptions
of donor intent took priority over legal rules involving charitable contributions.
87. Id.
88. See Katz, supra note 71, at 312 (quoting TV commentator Bill O'Reilly as saying "after
collecting more than $550 million from generous Americans, the Red Cross now says that some of that
money will not go to the families of the terror victims even though the donated money was given spe-
cifically for that purpose. The Red Cross apparently believes it has the right to do other things with your
donations.").
89. Barstow & Seelye, supra note 85; see also Katz, supra note 71, at 318 n.430 (citing Charita-
ble Contributions for September 11: Protecting Against Fraud, Waste, and Abuse: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
107th Cong. 33 (2001) (statement of Eliot Spitzer, New York State Attorney General)).
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ing to the Liberty Fund, they thought it was going to the victims of the
disaster . ".."90
In contrast, officials at the Red Cross believed that donors would sup-
port a decision to create a reserve for future terrorist attacks. 91 Joshua Got-
baum, the chief executive of the September 11 Fund, noted that surveys
conducted in October and November of 2001 suggested that the majority of
donors to the fund "were not specifically focused on helping only the most
direct victims of the attacks."'92 Donors themselves probably had varied
reasons for contributing and multiple wishes for the use of the funds.
The public outcry concerning donor intent ultimately led to a decision
by the Red Cross to restrict spending of the Liberty Fund to the victims of
September 11.93 This decision resulted in a variety of problems. Surplus
funds will not be available for future attacks, and the Red Cross will need
to ask for more contributions in the event of future disasters.94 "Victims of
September 11" was defined so narrowly that funds could not be used for
some people affected by the attack.95 And several years after September 11,
people wondered whether donor intent may have been more complex than
the view that funds should be spent immediately on direct victims of the
attack. One donor said he had wanted the charities to create a permanent
safety net and worried that the money had been spent too quickly.
96
90. Katz, supra note 71, at 312-13 (citing Charitable Contributions for September 11: Protecting
Against Fraud, Waste, and Abuse: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of
the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 2, 44 (2001) (statement of Rep. Charles
F. Bass)).
91. Seeid.at313.
92. See Families Fret, supra note 68.
93. See Katz, supra note 71, at 312-17.
94. The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina highlights the importance of maintaining reserves. Follow-
ing Hurricane Katrina, the Red Cross quickly distributed $1.2 billion in aid but estimated that it would
need another $1 billion. To meet ongoing needs the Red Cross took out $150,000 in loans to be able to
maintain the pace of aid distribution as donations slowed. Paul Light, a New York University public
service professor, noted that raising the additional $1 billion will be difficult, in not impossible. See
Rebecca Carroll, Red Cross Admits Flaws in Aid, OREGON REGISTER GUARD (Eugene), Oct. 1, 2005.
95. See Stephanie Strom, A Nation Challenged: Charities; Narrowly Drawn Rules Freeze Out
Tens of Thousands of Indirect Victims, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 23, 2002, at A, available at
http://www.nytimes.conV2002/04/23/nyregion/nation-challenged-charities-narrowiy-drawn-rules-
freeze-tens-thousands-indirect.html.
96. See Lydia Polgreen, Three Years Later: The Charities; With Funds Winding Down, Questions
Remain About Longer-Term Needs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2004, at B8 (quoting Chris Burke as saying "I
gave money for that exact purpose, to create a permanent safety net, ... [b]ut that hasn't happened and
now they have spent all the money.").
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E. Brandeis and the Rose Art Museum
Edward and Bertha Rose made gifts of money to Brandeis University
for the purpose of creating a museum of modem and contemporary art, the
Rose Art Museum.97 Letters from the University to the Roses and other
documents, including the wills of Edward and Bertha Rose, state the intent
and understanding on both sides that the gifts would be used for the Rose
Art Museum.98 The Roses established an endowment fund to support the
museum, 99 and the will of Edward Rose states that he and Bertha "under-
stand that Brandeis has agreed that the Rose Art Museum will be main-
tained in perpetuity. . . ."100 After the university established the museum,
gifts from other donors followed, including a gift from Henry and Lois
Foster for a new wing for the museum, the Lois Foster Wing, 10 1 and gifts
of art from Mr. and Mrs. Herbert Lee
102 and other collectors. 103
In January 2009, the President of Brandeis presented a proposal to the
Brandeis Board of Directors that Brandeis close the Rose Art Museum and
sell the artwork.104 The Board agreed, although later information showed
that only twenty board members attended the meeting, ten members voted
by phone, and fifteen board members were neither present nor informed of
the agenda and did not vote. 105 Brandeis announced the decision on Janu-
ary 26, 2009, explaining that the decision arose in response to the "global
financial crisis and the deepening national economic recession" and the
97. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment Concerning the Rose Art Museum at 1, Rose v.
Brandeis Univ. (Jul. 27, 2009) [hereinafter "Rose Complaint"]; Rose Complaint at Exhibit B ("[O]n
August 19th, 1958, President Sacher indicated a firm initial pledge in the amount of $250,000 from Mr.
and Mrs. Edward Rose for the purpose of underwriting an art gallery and museum."). Other exhibits to
the complaint document further gifts.
98. See, e.g., Rose Complaint, supra note 97, at Exhibit A. The Will of Edward Rose includes a
gift of $500,000 to Brandeis as an endowment fund "to defray the expense of maintaining the Mu-
seum .. " The paragraph making the gift adds "the executors may in their discretion from time to time
agree with Brandeis for substitute uses of said income or said Fund B, or any part thereof." The will
does not give Brandeis unilateral authority to modify the restriction.
99. See id. at 4.
100. Id.
101. See id. at Exhibit N-Q.
102. See id. at Exhibit S (letters to Mr. and Mrs. Herbert C. Lee thanking them for pieces of art and
listing the art given by the Lees).
103. See Geoff Edgers, Museum Backers Seek Halt to Selloff THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 28, 2009,
at Al (quoting Jonathan Novak, a museum overseer and Los Angeles art dealer who graduated from
Brandeis and has given art works and money over the years, "Had I had any idea when I donated work
that there was a chance they would be sold to benefit the university, I never would have donated
them.") Although a donor's thoughts about a gift are not binding on a charity unless the thoughts are put
into writing, when a donor contributes to an operating charity for a particular purpose, the donor as-
sumes the charity will continue operating for that purpose. See text accompanying notes 136-42.
104. Rose Complaint, supra note 97, at Exhibit E.
105. Ellen Howards, Cutting Off the Rose: Brandeis Not Smelling So Sweet, ART NEW ENGLAND,
Apr./May 2009, at 10, 10.
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need to "focus and sustain our core academic mission .... ,1106 In 2008,
Brandeis, like many universities, faced shrinking resources. The endow-
ment had decreased, and in addition, many of Brandeis's big donors had
assets invested with Bernie Madoff.107 Future gifts were in jeopardy, and
donations had provided a significant part of the operating resources at
Brandeis, perhaps more so than at other schools.
Brandeis realized that some of the artwork held in the Rose Art Mu-
seum was of great value.108 The Association of Art Museum Directors has
developed standards and a code of ethics that apply to art museums, includ-
ing deaccessioning rules or guidelines. 109 These standards provide that a
museum can sell art and replace it with other art that may be better for a
collection, but a museum should not sell art just to raise money. 110
Brandeis appears to have decided to close the museum so that those deac-
cessioning rules would not apply. 111 If the art is in storage, and there is no
museum director, selling the art may be easer.
Public outcry followed the decision to close the Rose, and the Attor-
ney General indicated that it would need to review each piece of art to de-
termine whether a donor had imposed a restriction on the art.' 12 Despite
expressions of concern from donors, students, and the community, in June
2009 Brandeis closed the Rose Art Museum and terminated the employ-
ment of the director. 113 Following the closure of the museum, three Over-
seers of the museum, all of whom were donors or legal representatives of
estates of donors, 114 filed suit against Brandeis, asking for a preliminary
injunction to prevent Brandeis from closing the Rose, selling any artwork,
106. Rose Complaint, supra note 97, at Exhibit E.
107. Allison Hoffman, Selling the Family Jewels, THE JERUSALEM POST, May 26, 2009. Bernie
Madoff operated a Ponzi scheme that came to light in 2008. Many investors lost everything they had
invested through Madoff. See Madoff Pleads Guilty in Wall Street Swindle
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/law/jan-june09/madoff_03-12.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).
108. The collection was estimated to be worth $350 million in 2008. See Howards, supra note 105.
109. See Position Paper of the Association of Art Museum Directors, Art Museums and the Prac-
tice of Deaccessioning, http://www.aamd.org/papers/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2010) [hereinafter "Position
Paper"]; see also Posting of Felix Salmon to Market Movers,
http://www.portfolio.com/viewslblogs/market-movers/ (Jan. 30, 2009 17:06 EST).
110. See Position Paper, supra note 109.
111. See Salmon, supra note 109; Posting of Felix Salmon to Market Movers,
http://www.portfolio.com/views/blogs/market-movers/ (Feb. 1, 2009 18:29 EST).
112. CultureGrrl, http://www.artsjournal.com/culturegrrl/ (Jan. 31, 2009 14:28 EST); Museum Law
Blog, http://www.museumlaw.wordpress.com (Jan. 28, 2009).
113. Geoff Edgers, Rose Closes - Temporarily - But Art Lovers Express Anguish, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, May 18,2009.
114. Rose Complaint, supra note 97. The three plaintiffs are Meryl Rose, a member of the Rose
family, a donor, and an Overseer of the museum; Jonathan 0. Lee, a son of Mildred Lee, the Personal
Representative of the Estate of Mildred Lee, and an Overseer; and Lois Foster, a donor and Executrix of
the estate of Henry Foster, and an Overseer. Id.
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or using any of the Rose endowment funds and also asking the court, in the
alternative or in addition, to order Brandeis to turn over the artwork and
endowment funds to the Rose Preservation Fund, Inc. or another organiza-
tion "to further, as nearly as possible, the intent of Edward and Bertha Rose
and of those many donors who followed their lead."'
15
The odd thing about the way Brandeis made its decision concerning
the Rose Art Museum and the artwork is that the public statements do not
discuss donor restrictions on the gifts that made the museum possible. The
University's press release expressed gratitude "to everyone who expressed
their love for art and admiration for Brandeis's academic mission by help-
ing to create, build, and support the museum."'1 6 Then the press release
talked about "hard choices" without reference to the fact that the donors
who helped "create, build, and support the museum" made their gifts sub-
ject to purpose restrictions.
117
In May 2009, blogger Lee Rosenbaum wrote: "One can only hope that
Brandeis President Jehuda Reinharz and his supporters have come to rec-
ognize that the potential costs to the university's reputation among donors
and the broader educational and cultural communities are not worth the
financial benefits that might accrue from selling off valuable educational
assets."1 18 Perhaps they will. The Rose reopened with a new show, entitled
"The Rose at Brandeis: Works From the Collection." 119 The future of the
museum remains uncertain.
I11. WHY CHARITIES SHOULD (AND USUALLY Do) GIvE EFFECT TO
DONOR INTENT
A. Legal Duty
The law requires charities to comply with donors' restrictions. Do-
nors' restrictions come in several different forms. A donor's restriction will
typically be in the form of a purpose restriction-a direction about how a
gift should be used or a limit on the possible uses of the gift. A donor may
also impose a time restriction-a direction about when a gift can be used.
For example, a donor might direct that a gift be spent over a ten-year period
or that a gift be held as an endowment. Finally, a donor may make a gift
115. Id. at 11-12.
116. Id. at Exhibit E.
117. Id.
118. CultureGrrl, http://www.artsjoumal.com/culturegrrl/ (May 18, 2009, 17:52 EST).
119. Sebastian Smee, Rose Art Museum Display Justifies the Passions, THE BOSTON GLOBE Nov.
5, 2009, at 1.
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that is facially unrestricted but that the donor intends the charity to use for
the charity's current purposes. The donor may not restrict the use of the gift
to a particular purpose, but the donor does not expect the charity to change
its purposes and divert the gift to other uses. Finally, this article discusses
only donor-restricted gifts and not board-designated funds or assets. Some-
times a board of directors will set aside assets for a particular purpose. A
soup kitchen might set aside funds to build a second operating facility or to
create an endowment to support the charity's work. A subsequent board
can change either of those restrictions pursuant to the board's general fidu-
ciary duties to the charity. However, if a donor contributes to the building
fund or the endowment fund, then the donor contributions will likely be
considered donor-restricted.
The parameters of the legal rules on restricted gifts remain uncer-
tain120 and may differ depending on whether a charity is organized as a
trust or a nonprofit corporation, 121 but the basic legal rule requires compli-
ance with donor intent.122 The rule lies in various duties that apply to those
who manage charitable gifts.
The law of charities began in trust law, 123 and trust law concepts in-
fuse the law of charitable organizations whether a charity is organized as a
trust or as a nonprofit corporation. In recent years, the rules applicable to
charitable trusts and to nonprofit corporations have been merging1 24 with
the application of corporate fiduciary principles to trustees of charities or-
ganized as trusts and the application of trust law modification rules to re-
120. See Iris J. Goodwin, Ask Not What Your Charity Can Do for You: Robertson v. Princeton
Provides Liberal-Democratic Insights Into the Dilemma of Cy Pres Reform, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 75, 76
(2009) ("Where charities do operate under a woefully inadequate set of laws, however, is with respect
to special purpose-or restricted-gifts. The law here does little to guide (and, when necessary, police)
charities in their stewarding of such gifts over time.").
121. See Robert A. Katz, Let Charitable Directors Direct: Why Trust Law Should Not Curb Board
Discretion Over a Charitable Corporation 's Mission and Unrestricted Assets, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
689, 694-98 (2005).
122. The Attorney General of Montana expressed dismay in a case in which the donee of a charita-
ble easement on land simply ignored a restriction. The Attorney General stated, "The most disturbing
aspect of this whole matter, however, is the complete failure of the [donee] and the Dowds [purchasers
of property subject to the donated easement] to acknowledge their duty to comply with the terms of
both Lowham's charitable gift of the conservation easement and the Scenic Preserve Trust." Memoran-
dum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Salzburg v. Dowd, CV-2008-0079, at 73 (Wyo. 4th
Jud. Dist. Aug. 12, 2009).
123. See Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law, and
Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593, 597-98 (1999) (describing the development of charity law in the
United States).
124. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. I (The American Law Institute Preliminary
Draft No. 5 2009) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES] (explaining that corporate fiduciary standards are being
applied to trustees as well as to directors, modification rules are increasingly similar but not entirely the
same, and regulators have the same enforcement powers over both charitable trusts and nonprofit
corporations).
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stricted gifts to nonprofit corporations. 125 An American Law Institute pro-
ject on nonprofit organizations, the Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Or-
ganizations ("ALl Principles"), 126 continues the trend of minimizing legal
differences based on organizational form, although the ALl Principles note
that "some differences are irreducible."' 127 These differences include a few
differences in the law's treatment of restricted gifts, in that the basic duty to
honor a donor-imposed restriction exists in both sets of laws, but the rules
on modification differ somewhat. 128
Trust law creates a duty of obedience in the trustee to carry out the
purposes of the trust. 129 When a donor makes a restricted gift to a charita-
ble trust, the donor is imposing on the trustee the duty to carry out the
terms of the restriction. A restricted gift to a charity organized as a non-
profit corporation also carries with it the duty to carry out the restriction,
although cases have applied different legal rationales to reach this result. 130
In some states the charity holds the gift "in trust," 131 and in other states the
gift is not technically characterized as a trust, although the charity is bound
by any restrictions imposed by the donor. 132
125. The UNIFORM PRUDENT MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT incorporates the
modification rules of cy pres in § 6(c) and deviation § 6(b). UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL
FUNDS ACT § 6(b)-(c) (2006).
126. PRINCIPLES, supra note 124. This article cites to the current draft, which may be revised as the
process of developing the Principles continues.
127. Id. at 2.
128. See infra text accompanying notes 144-57.
129. See Rob Atkinson, Obedience as the Foundation of Fiduciary Duty, 34 J. CORP. L. 43 (2008).
130. See Evelyn Brody, From the Dead Hand to the Living Dead: The Conundrum of Charitable-
Donor Standing, 41 GA. L. REV. 1183, 1206-09 (2007) (citing Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 647 (1819)).
131. See, e.g., In re Estate ofHeil v. Nevada, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1503, 1510 (Ct. App. 1989) (be-
quest to State of Nevada for the purpose of preservation of wild horses in Nevada created a charitable
trust); Chattowah Open Land Trust v. Jones, 636 S.E.2d 523, 524-26 (Ga. 2006) (devise of decedent's
home and surrounding acreage to a charitable organization for the purpose of maintaining the property
in perpetuity exclusively for conservation purposes within the meaning of Internal Revenue Code
§ 170(h) "unambiguously created a charitable trust," and decedent's failure to use the terms "trust" and
"trustee" did not alter the outcome because the strict use of those terms is not required to establish a
trust); State v. Rand, 366 A.2d. 183, 186, 196 (Me. 1976) (gift of land to city to be "forever held and
maintained.., as a public park" created a charitable trust); City of Salem v. Attorney Gen., 183 N.E.2d
859, 860 (Mass. 1962) (devise of land to city to be used "forever as Public Grounds" established a
trust); Bankers Trust Co. v. N.Y. Women's League for Animals, 23 N.J. Super. 170, 175, 183 (App.
Div. 1952) (bequest to charitable organization to be used to purchase a rural farm for the care of ani-
mals created a trust); Lewis v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 128 N.E.2d 818, 819-20 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954)
(devise of testator's residence and residue of estate to county "for the purpose of being kept, maintained
and operated as a home for old ladies" created a charitable trust); Abel v. Girard Trust Co., 73 A.2d
682, 684 (Pa. 1950) ("A charitable trust is created by deed where there appears in the deed an intention
that the transferee shall hold the land subject to the equitable duty to use the land for a charitable pur-
pose.").
132. See Lancaster v. City of Columbus, 333 F. Supp. 1012, 1024 (N.D. Miss. 1971) ("It is settled
state law that lands taken and held by a municipality as a gift for a specific purpose are subject to the
law of trusts, and any use inconsistent with that intended by the dedicator constitutes a breach of
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The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS states that an unrestricted gift
to a charity organized as a nonprofit corporation does not create a charita-
ble trust, but a gift restricted to a specific purpose "creates a charitable trust
of which the institution is the trustee .... ,,133 Section 400 of the ALI Prin-
ciples rejects the Restatement position and instead states that a transfer to a
charity does not automatically create a charitable trust. 134 Whether a re-
stricted gift is technically characterized as a trust should not affect donor
restrictions, given that the charity must abide by restrictions imposed by a
donor in any event. 13
5
An additional question may arise with respect to facially unrestricted
gifts to a charity organized as a nonprofit corporation. A gift may not carry
a specific restriction, but a donor who contributes money or assets to a
charity probably assumes that the charity will use the gift for the purposes
for which the charity is operating at the time of the gift. 136 A trust cannot
change its purpose without authorization by a court, 137 but a nonprofit cor-
poration can usually amend its articles of incorporation or bylaws under
state statutes.1 38 If a nonprofit corporation can change its purpose by
trust."); Estate of Vallery v. St. Luke's Cmty. Found., 883 P.2d 24, 28 (Co. App. Ct. 1993) (bequest for
a specified charitable purpose constituted a "restricted gift" as opposed to a trust, but doctrine ofcypres
applied); Blumenthal v. White, 683 A.2d 410, 411-14 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996) (gift of land to a city with
instructions that land be used as a public park and not transferred did not create a trust "in strict sense,"
but "it may be so regarded," and city held land as a "quasi-trustee" and deviation doctrine applied); Sch.
Dist. No. 70 v. Wood, 13 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Neb. 1944) ("a gift to a charitable corporation [for a par-
ticular purpose] is equivalent to a bequest upon a charitable trust and will ordinarily be governed by the
same rules."); St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Bennett, 22 N.E.2d 305, 308 (N.Y. 1939) (while no trust arises "in
a technical sense," a charitable corporation "'may not... receive a gift made for one purpose and use it
for another, unless the court applying the cy pres doctrine so commands"); Lefkowitz v. Lebensfeld, 68
A.D.2d 488, 496, (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) ("[T]he never disturbed equitable doctrine that although gifts
to a charitable organization do not create a trust in the technical sense, where a purpose is stated a trust
will be implied, and the disposition enforced by the Attorney General, pursuant to his duty to effectuate
the donor's wishes.").
133. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 cmt. a (2003).
134. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 124, § 400(a), (b) (cross-references omitted):
(a) A transfer to a charity does not create a charitable trust unless the settlor expresses an in-
tent to create a charitable trust and the trustee, which may be a charity, agrees to act as trustee
of that trust according to its terms.
(b) A gift to a charity not made in trust transfers complete ownership to the charity, although
the charity is bound by any conditions or restrictions imposed by the donor in the gift instru-
ment.
135. The existence of a trust could affect the nature of fiduciary duties unrelated to the enforcement
of a donor's restrictions. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 124, at 1-2.
136. For example, donors of artwork to the Rose Art Museum assumed that Brandeis would con-
tinue to operate the museum and would not sell the art to generate money to cover university operating
expenses. See Edgers, supra note 103.
137. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 (deviation), § 67 (cypres) (2003).
138. See REV. MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§10.01-10.21 (1987), available at
http://www.muridae.con/nporegulation/documents/model_npo_corpact.html (last visited Mar. 28,
2010).
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amending its articles, then the question is whether that change can apply to
an unrestricted gift received before the change.
Some court decisions have articulated the idea that the nonprofit cor-
poration holds the gift "on a charitable trust" and thus must carry out the
implied restriction. 139 A donor would expect that, with respect to money
already received, the organization would continue to use that money for the
purposes for which the donor gave it-the purposes carried out by the char-
ity at the time of the gift. 140 Other courts have held that even if the gift does
not technically create a trust, the charity cannot change its purposes with
respect to gifts already received. 141 The ALI Principles take the position
that a facially unrestricted gift made to a charity having a single, narrow
purpose is not viewed as a restricted gift. Rather, a donor's desire that
the gift be used for a specific purpose must be expressed, in writing, in
order for the recipient charity to be bound to use that gift for that pur-
pose. 142
Even under the ALl Principles, in many situations a written document,
perhaps in the form of a solicitation from the charity, 143 will exist, so the
charity must be careful about restrictions that may apply, even if the charity
amends its articles of incorporation.
Under both trust law and the law of nonprofit corporations, the rules
for modifying donor restrictions indicate the legal force of restrictions im-
139. See, e.g., Holt v. Coll. of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons, 394 P.2d 932, 937 (Cal. 1964)
(permitting directors of a nonprofit corporation to sue other directors for breach of trust); Queen of
Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 66 Cal. App. 3d 359, 365 (Ct. App. 1977) (agreeing with the Attorney Gen-
eral that the nonprofit corporation held assets "impressed with a charitable trust" to operate as the
articles provided and in the manner in which it had been conducting its activities); see also 15 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 5547(a) (2006) (stating that a nonprofit corporation holds property "in trust, for the
purpose or purposes set forth in its articles.").
140. For example, if a donor made a substantial gift to a local environmental organization, and then
the charity changed its purpose to promote sports for children, the donor would presumably not want
the gift already made to be used for sports.
141. See Attorney Gen. v. Hahnemann Hosp., 494 N.E. 2d 1011, 1020-21 (Mass. 1986) (stating
that the charity could broaden its purposes by amending its articles, but that the charity could not use
unrestricted donations received prior to the amendment for the new purposes). In Hahnemann, the court
noted, "The Attorney General argues that the board also would violate its fiduciary duty to donors of
unrestricted gifts by abandoning the purpose for which it was organized and had held itself out to the
public." Id. at 1019 n.15. The court added: "As the Attorney General, colorfully, but no doubt correctly,
observes in his reply brief, 'those who give to a home for abandoned animals do not anticipate a future
board amending the charity's purpose to become research vivisectionists."' Id. at 1021 n.18; see also
Holt, 394 P.2d at 935 (stating that "charitable contributions must be used only for the purposes for
which they were received in trust.").
142. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 124, § 400 cmt. (d)(3); see also Katz, supra note 121 (advocating
maximum discretion for corporate boards, including discretion to change the mission of the charity).
143. Arguably, a written solicitation from a charity can be a "gift instrument" under the UNIFORM
PRUDENT MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT. See UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF
INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 2(3) cmt. (2006). The "gift instrument" definition includes written infor-
mation that is stored in an electronic medium and is retrievable, so solicitation materials posted on a
website could create a donor-restriction, if a donor responded to the solicitation with a gift. Id.
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posed by donors. If a charity could ignore the restrictions, the law would
not need special rules for modification of those restrictions. In trust law, the
modification rules of cy pres and equitable deviation have long applied to
charities organized as charitable trusts. 144 These rules indicate that a donor
restriction can be modified only under limited circumstances and with court
approval. 145 Courts have applied the rules of cy pres and deviation to re-
stricted gifts held by nonprofit corporations, 146 but no direct statutory au-
thority existed for the application of those rules. 147 The UNIFORM
MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT (UMIFA) 14 8 simply states
that the act "does not limit the application of the doctrine of cy pres," after
the act provides that a donor or the appropriate court may release a restric-
tion. 149 A Connecticut court asked to apply UMIFA noted that a restriction
on a gift held by a nonprofit corporation might be subject to a cy pres ac-
tion, but the court did not need to determine the application of cy pres in
the case before it.150
The Uniform Law Commission15' revised UMIFA and promulgated
the UNIFORM PRUDENT MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT
(UPMIFA) in 2006.152 One of the revisions incorporated the doctrines of cy
pres and deviation from trust law directly into UPMIFA. 153 UPMIFA ap-
plies primarily to charities organized as nonprofit corporations, but only to
144. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ I cmt. c, 67 (2003); infra text accompanying notes
281-310.
145. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67.
146. See supra notes 131-32.
147. The UNIFORM MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT states that the act "does not limit
the application of the doctrine of cy pres." UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 7(d) (1972).
A Connecticut court asked to apply the Act noted that a restriction on a gift held by a nonprofit corpora-
tion might be subject to a cy pres action, but the court did not need to determine whether cy pres ap-
plied. See Yale Univ. v. Blumenthal, 621 A.2d 1304, 1306 nn.4-5 (Conn. 1993).
148. Forty-seven jurisdictions adopted this act, so its rules have had wide application. The
UNIFORM PRUDENT MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT has replaced the UNIFORM
MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT in most states. As of September 2009, forty-four juris-
dictions have adopted the UNIFORM PRUDENT MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT. See
Enactment Status Map, http://www.upmifa.org/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=5&tabid=68 (last visited
Mar. 12, 2010).
149. UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 7(a), (d).
150. Blumenthal, 621 A.2d at 1306 nn.4-5.
151. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, also known as the Uni-
form Law Commission, is a national organization that develops uniform acts on state law issues for
adoption by state legislatures. See Uniform Law Commission, www.nccusl.org (last visited Mar. 12,
2010).
152. See Susan N. Gary, Charities, Endowments, and Donor Intent: The Uniform Prudent Man-
agement of Institutional Funds Act, 41 GA. L. REv. 1277, 1288-89 (2007), (describing the history of the
UNIFORM MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT and the development of the UNIFORM
PRUDENT MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT).
153. See UNF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 6(b), cmt. (c) (2006) (explaining
that drafters adapted language from the UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 412 (deviation) and § 413 (cypres)).
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funds held by those charities as institutional funds (as defined in
UPMIFA). 154 Thus, the modification rules of cy pres and deviation apply to
charitable trusts through trust law, to restrictions on funds held by nonprofit
corporations through UPMIFA, and to restrictions on other assets held by
nonprofit corporations through case law.155
The inclusion of the modification rules in UPMIFA reflects the impor-
tance of the general rule that a nonprofit corporation must give effect to
donor intent. The doctrines of cy pres and deviation had been applied to
restricted gifts held by nonprofit corporations, 156 and now the inclusion of
the statutory language in UPMIFA confirms the application of these trust
law rules to nonprofit corporations. In addition, the sections of UPMIFA
that describe the powers of the directors with respect to investment decision
making, endowment spending, and delegation all refer to the superseding
power of the intent of the donor, as expressed in a gift instrument.
157
B. From the Charity's Perspective
1. Ethical Reasons
Documents developed by organizations of fund-raising professionals
and their advisors identify respect for donor intent as an important ethical
principal for those who raise money on behalf of charities. 158 The underly-
ing reason for ethical behavior with respect to fundraising is the need to
maintain donor trust, 159 which could be viewed simply as in the self-
interest of the charity. A charity's ability to raise money will depend on
maintaining the trust of its donors. The statements of ethical principles go
beyond the interest of individual charities, however, noting that the charita-
154. The UNIFORM PRUDENT MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT's definition of "insti-
tutional finds" specifically excludes "program-related assets." UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF
INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 2(5)(A). Thus, restrictions on artwork held by a museum or a conserva-
tion easement placed on land held in a land trust will not be subject to the Act. See infra, text accompa-
nying notes 364-71.
155. Seesupra notes 131-32.
156. Id.
157. See UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT §§ 3(a), 4(a), 5(a).
158. See Patricia F. Lewis, Selected Materials on Ethical Considerations in Planned Giving, 1996
ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS, CHARITABLE GIvING TECHNIQUES 277, 279-80 (reproduc-
ing A Donor's Bill of Rights, developed by the American Association of Fund-Raising Counsel, Asso-
ciation for Healthcare Philanthropy, Council for Advancement and Support of Education, and National
Society of Fund Raising Executives, and the Statement of Ethical Principles and Standards of Profes-
sional Practice, adopted by the National Society of Fund Raising Executives (NSFRE)).
159. See id. at 281 (reproducing a position paper on professional compensation prepared by the
NSFRE Ethics Committee in March 1992 that explains "Charities rely, in part, on voluntary donations
to meet their budgets. Donor trust is of paramount importance. To earn and keep that trust, every aspect
of charitable activity must be absolutely ethical.").
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ble sector as a whole depends on each charity's providing its services, not
to a donor, but to the societal interests the charity serves. 160 A donor will
contribute to a charity if the donor is reasonably assured that the charity
will carry out its side of the "contract" implicit in a donation. 161 The Stan-
dards of Professional Practice developed by the National Society of Fund
Raising Executives emphasize the importance of using contributions in
accordance with donors' intent, provide guidance about solicitation materi-
als and documentation, and remind fund raisers to obtain donor consent
before altering the conditions of a gift. Ensuring that "the intent of the do-
nor is honestly fulfilled" is good practice, of course, but is also ethically
correct behavior. 162 Indeed, a perception that a charity did not comply with
donor intent may lead to charges of unethical behavior.'
63
2. Reduced Donations
Any charity that depends on funds raised from donors must develop
and maintain good donor relations. If a donor gives the charity money for a
particular project and the donor then learns that the charity has not used the
money for the specified purpose, the donor will not be likely to give the
charity more money. Further, an unhappy donor may share his or her dis-
satisfaction with other potential donors. Either by word of mouth or more
publicly, a donor may discourage others from giving to the charity. 164
The Red Cross experienced problems with "negative branding"', 65 due
to perceived lack of respect for donor's intent in connection with funds
160. See id. at 282-83.
161. See id. at 282. The document compares a charity seeking donations with the profit-making
business and compares a commercial transaction with the gift by a donor to a charity and "the promise
that the service [to someone other than the donor] for which the donor implicitly contracted will, in fact,
be delivered by the charity." Id.; see Brody, supra note 130, at 1189 (explaining the difficulty of deter-
mining whether property law or contract law provides a better analysis for charitable gifts. Professor
Brody concludes that a new term, "giftracts," provides a better way to think about the gifts).
162. See Lewis, supra note 158, at 280.
163. See Katz, supra note 71, at 312 (describing the reaction of members of Congress at two con-
gressional subcommittee hearings held to investigate the Red Cross and its use of contributions received
after September 11).
164. During his lawsuit with Princeton, William Robertson made his fight as public as possible. In
an editorial he opined, "Greed, mismanagement and in some cases outright dishonesty by officials of
these organizations have created doubts in the minds of many donors whether charitable giving is the
best way to use scarce resources. Eventually this growing unease will exact a price." Robertson, supra
note 23. Whether Mr. Robertson's words had any effect on other donors cannot be determined.
165. Maryann Slutsky, director of financial development for the Nassau County chapter of the
American Red Cross, used the term "negative branding" in describing the public response when people
learned that money donated after September 11 would not go entirely to victims of the September 11
attacks. Caroline B. Smith, Fund-Raisers Face a Drop in Dollars, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2003. Ms.
Slutsky described a significant drop in contributions to the Red Cross as due to "a very slowed econ-
omy, the war and the uncertainty in the world right now" but noted that the negative branding might
also have affected donations. Id.
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raised by the Red Cross following the September 11 attack on the World
Trade Center. Concerns about the handling of donations led to criticism of
the Red Cross and perhaps to reduced donations. 166
Empirical data tying reduced future donations directly to a charity's
failure to respect donor intent is limited, but the assumption that such links
exist appears in many sources. 167 The emphasis on donor intent in the
Standards of Professional Practice for fundraisers is linked to a primary
goal of fund raising-the goal of raising more money. 168 And commenta-
tors assume that failure to respect donor intent will result in fewer dona-
tions. 169
3. Greater Official Oversight
Charity officials often view donor intent as a cornerstone of their en-
forcement concerns. 170 A charity that acts in contravention of restrictions
imposed by a donor may face a legal challenge brought by a state attorney
general, and the attorney general may decide that control of the gift should
be taken away from the charity. In the Buck Trust case, concerns over the
trustee's desire to "change donor intent" led the court to remove the San
Francisco Foundation as trustee. 171 Although the donor had specifically
chosen the San Francisco Foundation to manage the gift, that organization
166. Newspaper articles describe, anecdotally, the frustrations of donors over the administration of
Red Cross funds. See Families Fret, supra note 68 ("Many of those who donated feel that the charitable
organizations have not fully honored their wishes for their contributions .... ); see also Jennifer Vigil,
Audit: Red Cross Handled Funds Properly; $5.8 Million Spent on Victims of Fires, THE SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE, Oct. 13, 2004, at Local (reporting that contributions to the San Diego Red Cross
plummeted after criticism connected with spending of money raised for a fire in 2001 but that donations
had rebounded).
167. See Katz, supra note 121, at 720 (citing George G. Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital
Markets: The Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enter-
prises, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1102, 1159 n. 159 (2004)).
168. See Lewis, supra note 158, at 287.
169. See Abbinante, supra note 42, at 668 (stating in the introduction the author's argument that the
law should protect donor intent: "The importance of this struggle is simple - society should ensure that
donors' intentions are followed in order to encourage continued philanthropic activity by the
wealthy."); Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1121 (1993) (stating
that "disregarding donor intent will have an adverse effect on charitable giving"); Karen W. Arenson,
Spending It: Making Those Good Causes Do What the Donor Intended, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1997;
CultureGrrl, supra note 118 (commenting on the Rose Art Museum); but see Eisenstein, supra note 42,
at 1758-59 (noting the argument that "potential donors will keep wealth in private hands rather than
create charitable trusts if they believe their wishes will not be followed strictly" but also providing some
counter-arguments suggesting other reasons that donors give to charity and create foundations).
170. Although in the Barnes Foundation case, the Attorney General of Pennsylvania approved
modifications that altered the donor's intent. See supra, text accompanying notes 49-55.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
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lost its role due to concerns about whether it was carrying out the donor's
intent.17
2
The perception that the Red Cross planned to allocate some funds col-
lected after September 11 in ways that might not comply with donor intent
led to significant public criticism.173 As the criticism began to build in the
public arena, New York Attorney General Spitzer threatened to sue the Red
Cross for misrepresentation to donors and failure to comply with donor
intent. 174 In Mr. Spitzer's view, donors who contributed to the Red Cross
intended "unambiguously"' 175 that the funds be used for September 11 vic-
tims. Although Mr. Spitzer did not actually sue the Red Cross, the threat
probably contributed to the organization's decision to limit spending of
September 11 contributions to victims of the tragedy. 1
76
The criticism of the Red Cross also led to congressional hearings and
demands by federal and state officials that they be permitted greater moni-
toring authority over the Red Cross. 177 The Red Cross is a treaty obligation
organization, chartered by Congress. 178 As the only charity structured in
this way, the Red Cross has used its "quasi-governmental" position to
avoid oversight by state attorneys general. 179 In the aftermath of September
11, both Congress and several state attorneys general demanded a greater
role in monitoring the use of contributions. 180 In May 2002, Senator
Charles E. Grassley, chair of the Senate Finance Committee, ordered the
Red Cross to turn over a comprehensive accounting of its finances, one that
specified exactly how it and its chapters raised and disbursed its money.
18 1
The New York Times reported that Attorney General Spitzer was working
on draft legislation for Senator Grassley that would impose more stringent
reporting requirements on the Red Cross. 182 In Mr. Spitzer's words, "one
172. See id.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 87-90.
174. See Katz, supra note 71, at 312, 316-17.
175. Id. at 318 n.430 (citing Charitable Organizations 'Distribution of Funds Following the Recent
Terrorist Attacks Before the Oversight Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Ways and Means
Committee, 107th Cong. 33 (2001) (statement of Eliot Spitzer, New York State Attorney General)).
176. See id. at 314.
177. See Stephanie Strom, Red Cross Is Pressed to Open Its Books, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2002
[hereinafter Red Cross is Pressed]; Stephanie Strom, Red Cross Works to Renew Confidence Among
Donors, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2002.
178. 36 U.S.C. §§ 300101-300102 (2000).
179. Red Cross Is Pressed, supra note 177.
180. See id.
181. Press Release, Sen. Chuck Grassley's Office, Grassley Seeks Answers on Red Cross' 9-11
Relief (June 14, 2002) (on file at http://finance.senate .gov/press/grassley/prg061402.pdf).
182. See Red Cross Is Pressed, supra note 177.
[Vol 85:3
THE PROBLEMS WITH DONOR INTENT
lesson we have learned is that some additional degree of accountability
would be a good thing. *,183
The efforts to increase government oversight of the Red Cross relate
to the peculiar position of the Red Cross as a treaty obligation organization
and thus will not be broadly applicable. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to
suspect that significant public criticism of a charity could lead to the in-
volvement of regulatory officials with respect to that charity. For example,
in response to concerns about spending on athletics, the Colorado state
auditor sought an extensive review of the CU Foundation, the fund-raising
entity created to support the University of Colorado. 184 The audit initially
focused on tracking "specific donor gift transactions to ensure their pro-
ceeds have been spent in compliance with donor intent," 185 but sought to
go substantially further. A general sense on the part of the public that chari-
ties ignore donor intent could lead to new kinds of oversight at the state or
federal level.
4. Legal Proceedings Against the Charity's Executives
After the Allegheny Health, Education & Research Foundation
(AHERF), a Pittsburgh based hospital chain, declared bankruptcy; the at-
torney general of Pennsylvania discovered that funds restricted to specific
charitable purposes had been used to try to keep AHERF afloat. 186 The
attorney general brought charges against three executives for misusing the
endowment funds. 187 The attorney general charged the chief executive
183. Id. The Senate Finance Committee released a Staff Discussion Draft describing "proposals for
reforms and best practices in the area of tax-exempt organizations ...." The proposals address report-
ing requirements and include a proposal that organizations with gross receipts in excess of $250,000 be
required to obtain an independent audit of the organization's financial statements. Senate Finance
Committee, Staff Discussion Draft, at 9,
http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/2004HearingF.htm/hearings2004.htm (Mar. 2004); see also The
PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE,
ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS: A FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS AND THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR 7 (Jun. 2005), http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/Report/finalUPanel-FinalReport.pdf.
184. Todd Hartman & Kevin Vaughan, CU Foundation Fights Audit Critic Says Stance 'Raises
Suspicions'A bout Its Spending, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), Feb. 16, 2005, at 6A.
185. See id. (quoting Pete Webb, spokesperson for the CU Foundation).
186. Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law Enforce-
ment, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 948-49 n.44 (2004); Arthur L. Cobb & Herbert G. Hotchkiss, AHERF: It May
Have Started with a Bang, But Did It End in a Whimper?, 23 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 30 (2004); PR
Newswire, Pennsylvania Attorney General Fisher: Former AHERF Official Pleads to Raiding Endow-
ments; CEO sentenced 11-1/2 to 23 Months,
http://www.thefreelibrary.com[Pennsylvania+Attomey+General+Fisher:+Former+AHERF+Official+Pl
eads+to...-a090883281 (Aug. 29, 2002).
187. The attorney general brought charges against Sherif Abdeihak, the Chief Executive Officer,
Nancy Wynstra, the general counsel, and David McConnell, the Chief Financial Officer. See Cobb &
Hotchkiss, supra note 186.
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officer, chief financial officer, and general counsel with theft, conspiracy,
and misapplication of entrusted property.188 Many of the charges were
ultimately dropped, in part because the executives had not acted for per-
sonal gain. The chief executive pleaded guilty to a second-degree misde-
meanor charge for misapplication of entrusted property. 189 He served three
months of an eleven to twenty-three month sentence before being pa-
roled.190 The attorney general then sought return of the endowment funds
in the bankruptcy proceeding. The parties in the bankruptcy proceeding
agreed that $22 million of the $52 million in endowments would be re-
turned and the attorney general hoped to increase that amount. Although
some people expressed concern that the penalties imposed on the execu-
tives were too light,191 the fact that the attorney general sought criminal
penalties as well as return of the funds should serve as a warning to other
charity executives. 
192
C. From the Perspective of Donors and the Public
Donors want charities to give effect to any restrictions imposed by the
donors, and respect for the donors' wishes matters both to the donors and to
the public. In making a gift to a charity, a donor may be choosing from
among different charitable and noncharitable donees. If the donor chooses
to make a gift to a specific charity for a particular purpose, and restricts the
gift for that purpose, then so long as the charity agrees to the restriction, the
charity should carry out the donor's intent. The donor should be able to
negotiate the terms of the restrictions with the charity knowing that if the
charity agrees to accept the gift, the charity will comply with the restric-
tions.
188. See Brigid McMenamin, Donor's Intent, FORBES, May 15, 2000. In addition, donors whose
funds had been misused filed suit asserting seventeen claims against members of the Executive Com-
mittee of the Board, including the three persons charged by the attorney general. Browne v. Abdelhak,
No. 98-6688, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 12064, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 23 2000). The donors' suit included
two counts of violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Id. The
court dismissed all charges because the donors did not have a property interest, such as a right of re-
verter, in the property that had been misused. Id. at * 14.
189. PR Newswire, supra note 186.
190. Cobb & Hotchkiss, supra note 186 (noting that the attorney general had initially brought
nearly 1,500 charges against Sherif Abdelhak).
191. See id.; Editorial, AHERF Whimper; Its Former CEO Is Sentenced on a Single Count, PIrtS-
BURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 8, 2002, at B2.
192. PR Newswire, , supra note 186 ("'I hope this sentence sends a strong message to business
leaders across Pennsylvania: You are accountable for your actions. You can't hide the financial health
of your company with accounting tricks,' [Attorney General] Fisher said. 'This case was particularly
egregious, because charitable dollars were used to keep the company afloat."')
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Over time a charity and even the state government, which enforces the
donor's restrictions through the office of the Attorney General, may face
pressure to modify a restriction for reasons of political or financial expedi-
ence. For example, political pressure may have played a role in the Barnes
Foundation case because the established art community in Philadelphia
supported the decision to move the museum.193 Financial expedience cer-
tainly played a role in the Brandeis - Rose Art Museum situation. 194 A
modification may be tempting in the short-run, but the legal rules should
give the parties involved enough time to reflect on whether a modification
is wise. Further, a charity or the Attorney General may be no better able to
predict public benefit into the future than would the donor who imposed the
original restriction. Thus, the public may benefit from the donor's view of
an appropriate use of the gift. 195
Restrictions on gifts involving land or artwork provide examples of
situations in which public benefit may align with a donor's restriction. In
the Brandeis-Rose Art Museum case, the donors intended that the artwork
be displayed in a museum. 196 If Brandeis were permitted to sell the art to
help with the general financial needs of the university, then private collec-
tors might purchase the artwork. If that happened, the public would lose the
benefit of being able to see the artwork. Even though the public may bene-
fit from a sale of the artwork because the university will be in a better posi-
tion financially, the donor's restriction may be a better guide to public
benefit than a decision made by Brandeis.
A case involving land in Montana provides an example of the benefits
of enforcing donor intent in connection with the gift of a conservation
easement. 197 In 1993, the owner of a ranch in Montana gave a conservation
easement over the ranch to the Johnson County, Montana, Board of County
Commissioners. 198 The Board transferred the easement to the Scenic Pre-
serve Trust, created by the Board to hold property rights in Johnson
County. 199 In 1999, the original owner of the ranch sold it to Fred and
193. See supra text accompanying notes 48-53.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 112-15.
195. This article asserts that in many cases a donor's true intention may be unclear. An argument
that a donor may know best works if the donor's intent can be determined, but any determination of a
donor's intent should be made with a degree of skepticism. In some cases those arguing for or against
modification assert donor intent without any clear knowledge of that intent. In other cases intent may in
fact be clear.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 97-119.
197. Salzburg v. Dowd, CV-2008-0079 (Wyo. 4th Jud. Dist. Aug. 12,2009).
198. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 122, at 2.
199. See id. at 5-7.
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Linda Dowd, subject to all easements and other restrictions. 200 In 2001, a
company owning mineral rights underlying the property informed the
Dowds that it would develop coalbed methane on the property. 201 In re-
sponse to a request from the Dowds, the Board transferred the conservation
easement to the Dowds, which extinguished the easement.202 The Attorney
General of Montana has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asking the
court to declare the transfer of the easement null and void and direct that
the easement be held in trust for the benefit of the public. 203 Without the
oversight of the Attorney General, the donor's intent that the land be pro-
tected in perpetuity would have been defeated. The public would have lost
the benefit of the scenic nature of the land.
Finally, rules that protect donor intent may also protect the benefits of
pluralism in the charitable sector. Donors can contribute to whatever cause
and for whatever purpose they choose. Charities develop for all sorts of
purposes, and the pluralism of the sector leads to innovation and the oppor-
tunity for groups of people to develop nonmajoritarian ideas. The pluralism
of the charitable sector makes it "a powerfully positive force in American
life." 204
IV. How Do WE DETERMINE DONOR INTENT?
At their core, the disputes described at the beginning of this article not
only involve the question of whether a charity honored the intent of a do-
nor, but also what the intent of the donor actually was. 205 Words in a gift
agreement or solicitation can and should provide guidance regarding the
intent of a donor, but words can be ambiguous and susceptible to multiple
interpretations. Even words in a carefully negotiated and written gift
agreement may not have a plain meaning, especially if circumstances
change. 206 For some gifts, only limited written documentation of intent
200. See id. at 7.
201. Seeid. at8.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 74-75.
204. See John W. Gardner, The Independent Sector, in AMERICA'S VOLUNTARY SPIRIT: A BOOK OF
READINGS 4-5 (Brian O'Connell ed. 1983); see also Iris J. Goodwin, Ask Not What Your Charity Can
Do For You: Robertson v. Princeton Provides Liberal-Democratic Insights into the Dilemma of Cy Pres
Reform, 51 ARiz. L. REv. 75, 122 (2009).
205. The Rose Art Museum case may be the exception; the donor's intent that the gift be used for a
museum seems fairly clear. See supra text accompanying notes 97-119. In cases like Buck and Barnes,
circumstances had changed sufficiently that some modification was necessary, but the question of how
the donor's intent should guide any modifications remained.
206. John Wigmore, the evidence scholar, attacked the so-called plain meaning rule in probate law
saying, "The fallacy consists in assuming that there is or ever can be some one real or absolute mean-
ing. In truth there can be only some person's meaning: and that person, whose meaning the law is
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may exist, and arguments may involve varied understandings of what the
donor intended. Donor and donee may remember a lunch conversation in
distinctly different ways. 207 An additional problem may be that lawyer-
drafted language-the written documentation-may not accurately reflect
what the donor intended.20
8
Difficult issues involving the determination of a donor's intent arise in
a number of situations. A review of these problem areas points to the im-
portance of greater clarity in establishing donor intent at the time of the
gift. In many cases, however, a foolproof answer to the question of how to
establish and determine donor intent does not exist. Instead, anyone worry-
ing about donor intent should remember that, in many situations, donor
intent simply cannot be determined with certainty.
This section examines several recurring problems in determining the
intent of donors. Difficulty in understanding a donor's intent can arise
when circumstances affecting the purpose of the gift change, when the
meaning of terms used in a gift agreement changes, when a donor states a
general charitable purpose without specific guidance, and when the donor
gives to "endowment" without stating what that means. This section in-
cludes a discussion of how donor intent is sometimes used to advance other
arguments, and then concludes with a reminder of the legal rules on deter-
mining donor intent.
A. Changed Circumstances
A donor's intent may be reasonably clear at the time the donor makes
the gift. The donor may restrict the use of a gift to a particular purpose,
spelling out the restriction in a gift agreement, letter, or other document.
However, if circumstances affecting the purpose change over time, deter-
mining donor intent in the face of those changed circumstances may be
difficult. Documentation of donor intent, through gift agreements or solici-
tation materials, may not resolve the questions that arise.
seeking, is the writer of the document .... [T]he 'plain meaning' is simply the meaning of the people
who did not write the document." 9 John H. Wigmore, EVIDENCE § 2462 at 198 (James H. Chadbourn
rev. 1981) (emphasis in original). If the writer is dead, which is always the case in probate law and
often the case in disputes involving donor intent, then the person whose meaning counts is not avail-
able.
207. The UNIFORM MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT and UNIFORM PRUDENT
MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT limit the legal enforceability of donor intent to written
documents. UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 1(6) (1972); UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF
INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 2(3) (2006) (defining "gift instrument" to mean written documents). The
Acts then use the term "gift instrument" in several sections to indicate that the Acts are subject to donor
intent, as expressed in a gift instrument.
208. See infra text accompanying notes 228-36 (discussing the Helmsley Charitable Trust).
2010]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
1. Changes Shortly After Gift Made
Sometimes a donor will not have all the relevant facts at the time the
donor makes a gift, or the circumstances may change shortly after the dona-
tion. When the Herzog Foundation contributed money to Bridgeport Uni-
versity for nursing scholarships, neither the donor nor the university
expected the nursing school to close just five years later.20 9 Typically,
when circumstances change that quickly, the charity will notify the donor
and try to work out a modification, 210 not only for legal reasons but also
because maintaining good donor relations is key to future fundraising.
However, the University of Bridgeport did not immediately notify the
Herzog Foundation when the nursing school closed. The university notified
the foundation some months after the closure, but apparently did not pro-
pose an alternative use for the funds. 211 The foundation then sued the uni-
versity to enforce the restriction, and alleged that the university had
commingled the gift with its operating funds. 212 Although the court deter-
mined that the donor lacked standing to sue,213 the university suffered the
financial costs of the lawsuit as well as the negative press.
Donors making gifts to provide for victims of the September 11 at-
tacks may have assumed that the money would be needed to help the vic-
tims meet financial needs associated with the loss of a breadwinner or the
loss of a job.214 Given the huge amount of money raised, it seems likely
that some donors would have preferred that a portion of the money be set
aside for future disasters. The changed circumstances (the amount of
money donated) became apparent quite soon after donors made gifts, but
the number of donors involved made ascertaining individual intent-and
potentially modifying the purpose restriction-impossible.
When Beryl Buck drafted her testamentary charitable trust, the stock
that would fund the trust had a value of around $7 million. In just ten years,
the value of the trust soared to $400 million, but because the increase in
value happened after Mrs. Buck died, she could not revise her gift to take
into account the change in value. She might have expanded the geographic
reach of her trust or made other changes had she known how much money
would be involved, but when the change occurred she had no input.
209. See Carl J. Herzog Found. v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 699 A.2d 995, 996 (Conn. 1997).
210. For the rules on modification by donor consent, see infra text accompanying notes 273-80.
211. Herzog, 699 A.2d at 996.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. For a discussion of donor response to September 11, see supra text accompanying notes 87-
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2. Changes that Develop Long After Gift Made
Most questions involving changed circumstances arise long after a gift
was made, usually when the donor is no longer alive. Changes may mean
that the original purpose no longer makes sense or has become impossible
to accomplish. A fund created to provide financial support for spouses of
soldiers who fought in World War I will eventually have no beneficiaries.
Someone making this gift could have foreseen the eventual problem, but a
donor might not have imagined that assets would still be available at the
time the last spouse died.
Other changed circumstances are not easy to foresee. A donor who
creates a scholarship fund for students graduating from a particular high
school may not consider that the high school could someday close. A fund
to protect polar bear habitats may be of no use if polar bears become ex-
tinct or no longer live in the wild. Just as a donor contributing to a fund in
1900 could not have foreseen the impacts of computers, a donor in 2009
cannot imagine the world one hundred or even fifty years from now.
B. Changes in the Meaning of Terms
Questions of intent can arise because the interpretation of words
changes over time. For example, imagine a 1950 gift agreement that cre-
ated a fund "to support families by assisting with the costs of adoption." In
the half century since the donor made the gift, the legal definitions of "fam-
ily" and "adoption" have changed. Should the charitable donee interpret the
terms in the gift agreement based on 1950 definitions or based on current
understandings of the terms? Did the donor mean to limit the agreement to
legal definitions, or did the donor intend a more general understanding of
what "family" means? Did the donor intend to cover the costs of interna-
tional adoptions, including the costs of the parents' travel to pick up the
adoptive child? Should someone interpreting the document look beyond the
written text to try to determine what a donor intended nearly sixty years
ago? And even if the intent of the donor is clear, if the donor made the gift
many years ago, should "dead hand control" be loosened at some point? 215
The Robertson family's concerns about Princeton's use of the Robert-
son gift to support the Woodrow Wilson School may have been based, in
215. Commentators who prefer a loosening of restrictions over time refer to "dead hand control"
while those who prefer continued deference to a donor's original words describe the importance of
"donor intent." See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 129; Atkinson, supra note 169, at 1142-48; Alex M.
Johnson, Jr., Limiting Dead Hand Control of Charitable Trusts: Expanding the Use of the Cy Pres
Doctrine, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 353, 391 (1999).
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part, on changes in the meaning of "careers in government service, with
particular emphasis of the education of such persons for careers in those
areas of the Federal Government that are concerned with international rela-
tions and affairs. '216 In 1960, Charles Robertson recorded some notes of
conversations he had with government employees in Washington, D.C.
217
The notes indicate interest in having the Woodrow Wilson School train
graduates to take jobs with federal agencies and departments, and the notes
also report that scientific knowledge was of particular importance due to
the Cold War with the Soviet Union.218 Marie Robertson made her gift in
1961, but the gift remained anonymous for over ten years. When Robert F.
Goheen revealed the identity of the donor at a ceremony in 1973, he noted
the changes in education that had occurred and continued to occur.219 The
documents establishing the gift had not tried to define the purposes too
narrowly and had been drafted broadly enough to accommodate changes in
the way the Woodrow Wilson School carried out the general purposes.22
0
Mr. Goheen's 1973 remarks point with pride to the fact that deans, direc-
tors, and faculty had carried forward the idea of "advanced, professional
education aimed at public service careers. '221 Charles Robertson himself
wrote in 1977 about the "first-rate" program at the Woodrow Wilson
School. 222
Although Charles Robertson seemed generally pleased with the
Robertson Foundation, the court documents filed by the plaintiffs in the
lawsuit with Princeton quote several expressions of concern by Charles
over the types of jobs students graduating from the Woodrow Wilson
School were taking. 223 Fewer students were going to work for the federal
government then he had expected. Although students continued to pursue
careers in public service, the nature of those careers changed in the years
following the gift to Princeton, due to changes in the outside world.
Professor Iris Goodwin explains:
"Almost immediately upon the establishment of the Robertson Founda-
tion, the world changed so that employment with the U.S. government
216. See Certificate of Incorporation, supra note 9, at 3(a).
217. See Charles Robertson's Notes, supra note 7.
218. Id.
219. See June 12, 1973 Remarks by President Goheen on Unveiling of Robertson Foundation,
http://www.princeton.edu/robertson/documents/docs/Pres- Goheen-remarks.6-I2-73.pdf (last visited
Mar. 15, 2010) ("[T]he changing requirements of a shifting world-both overseas and domestically-
have forced a broader and more balanced approach as the School's graduate program has evolved.").
220. See Certificate of Incorporation, supra note 9.
221. Remarks by President Goheen, supra note 219.
222. See Charles Robertson's Letter, supra note 14.
223. See Goodwin, supra note 204, at 88-89 (citing various court papers filed in the case).
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held considerably less allure. At the time the gift was made, the nuclear
standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union was particularly
tense and the United States was not yet mired in Vietnam or embarrassed
by Watergate. This soon changed.... Also, not to be overlooked were
the new opportunities for public service available in the burgeoning
arena of nongovernmental organizations. By the early 1970s, these or-
ganizations were becoming as important in international relations as
were traditional government-based agencies. Finally, the nature of gov-
ernment had changed. The U.S. government began collaborating with
nongovernmental organizations and private finns, outsourcing policy
studies and other projects once the sole province of government. "Ser-
vice" in "international relations and affairs" could be rendered-and was
perhaps best rendered-in ways that did not directly involve the U.S.
government. [footnotes deleted]
224
The nature of "careers in government service" changed over time and
may have been the source of some of the concern over Princeton's man-
agement of the fund.225
C. Donor's Intent Stated in General Terms
A donor with substantial wealth may create a private foundation to
serve the donor's charitable purposes into the future. The donor may like
the status of having a foundation, may want the donor's name to continue
to be associated with good works far into the future, may want to bring
future generations of the family into philanthropy, and may want the do-
nor's charitable impact spread over many years. A donor may want to re-
tain control by using a foundation that will spread gifts to a charity over a
number of years, rather than making a substantial gift to the charity on a
one-time basis. A donor's control can be strengthened through the use of a
foundation, but after the donor's death the ongoing activities of the founda-
tion may raise questions about whether the foundation continues to honor
the donor's intent.
Often the organizational documents used to create a foundation may
state the purpose using broad, general language. A form used to create a
foundation may simply track the language of Internal Revenue Code Sec-
tion § 501(c)(3), 226 perhaps with recognition of the particular purposes of
224. Id.
225. The negotiated gift instrument did not limit the purposes of the gift to preparing students for
careers in government service, see Certificate of Incorporation, supra note 9, so reliance on those
particular words fails to consider the entire expression of the donor's intent. Nonetheless, changes in the
types of careers entered into by graduates of the Woodrow Wilson School fueled William Robertson's
arguments.
226. For example, the articles might say, "This foundation shall be organized and operated exclu-
sively for charitable, scientific, literary, religious, and educational purposes." See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)
(2000).
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the foundation added in a way that does not preclude changes over time. 227
The donor may prefer maximum flexibility to enable the donor and the
donor's family to change the direction of the foundation over time. If so,
then the broadly worded purposes should be taken at face value. In some
situations, however, the lawyer may draft the organizational documents
without discussing the details with the client. Lawyers typically draft flexi-
bility into private trusts, so that future contingencies will not create diffi-
culties for the trustee and trust beneficiaries. Lawyers drafting documents
to create a foundation may do the same, providing flexibility for the foun-
dation's managers to the extent the flexibility does not jeopardize tax bene-
fits.
The Leona M. and Harry B. Helmsley Trust may be an example of a
lawyer creating more flexibility than the donor intended. When Leona
Helmsley died in 2007, her will gave the residue of her estate to the Leona
M. and Harry B. Helmsley Charitable Trust, established by Ms. Helmsley
on April 23, 1999.228 The trust instrument states that the trustees "may
establish and administer programs for the charitable purposes authorized by
[a prior paragraph in the trust instrument] or they may, in their sole discre-
tion, distribute the net income and principal of the Trust Fund to and
among such one or more Charitable Organizations and in such amounts or
proportions as the Trustees, in their sole discretion, shall determine. '229 In
2003, Ms. Helmsley wrote a "mission statement" that indicated her inten-
tions for the trust. She gave two priorities for distributions: indigent people
and dogs. A year later she crossed out the provision for indigents, so the
mission statement directed the trustees to make grants for "(1) purposes
related to the provision of care for dogs; and (2) such other charitable ac-
tivities as the Trustees shall determine. ' 230 Based on the mission statement,
Ms. Helmsley seems to have intended that the primary focus of the trust be
on dog welfare, but the legal language does not limit the distributions to
organizations that benefit dogs.
After Ms. Helmsley's death, the trustees sought instruction from the
court about the legal effect the "mission statement. '231 The Surrogate Court
ruled that the mission statement did not bind the trustees, based on the lan-
227. The articles or bylaws might state the broad language of section 501 (c)(3), quoted in note 226,
and then say, "including for such purposes..." or "the primary purpose of this organization shall
be .... "
228. See In the Matter of the Trustees of the Leona M. and Harry B. Helmsley Charitable Trust, for
Advice and Direction, No. 2968/2007 (N.Y. Surrogate's Court filed February 19, 2009), available at
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/20090226decision.pdf.
229. Id. at 2 (quoting from the trust instrument).
230. Id. at 1.
231. Id.
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guage in the trust instrument giving them discretion over distributions.232
Shortly after the court's decision, the trustees announced initial distribu-
tions from the trust. Very little went to dogs. The trustees distributed $135
million to medical centers, health care organizations, and to educational,
conservation, and anti-poverty programs. They distributed $1 million to ten
animal-related organizations and many of those organizations focused on
human, rather than animal, welfare; for example by training guide dogs.
233
The trustees acted in a legally correct manner, but Ms. Helmsley might not
have been pleased.234
In the case of the Helmsley trust, contemporaneous, written statements
provide information about the donor's intent. For many foundations, the
organizational documents may be the only written evidence of intent. Years
later, the flexibility of broadly drafted purpose provisions may prove useful
and may, in fact, be what the donor intended all along. The Pew Memorial
Trust, for example, was established to "help meet human needs through
financial support of charitable organizations or institutions in the area of
education, social services, religion, health care, and medical research."
235
The wide scope of this expression of the donor's intent gives the founda-
tion flexibility to address issues as they change over time.
236
D. Endowments
A separate problem involving donor intent relates to gifts to endow-
ment funds. When a donor contributes to an endowment fund, the donor
may use words with imprecise meanings. The donor may direct the charity
to "pay only the income" from the fund, but that direction does not clearly
indicate what the donor meant because "income" does not have a single
meaning. For example, income may mean trust accounting income, which
traditionally did not include capital gains.237 The UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND
232. Id. at 2-3; see also Stephanie Strom, Not All of Helmsley's Trust Has to Go to Dogs, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2009.
233. See Sam Roberts, Trustees Begin to Parcel Leona Helmsley's Estate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,
2009.
234. The trustees mentioned that the organizations chosen were ones that Mr. and Mrs. Helmsley
had supported. Perhaps the distributions represent another example of following the intent of the person
who made the money rather than the intent of the donor. See infra text accompanying notes 253-66.
235. See MARTIN MORSE WOOSTER, THE GREAT PHILANTHROPISTS AND THE PROBLEM OF
"DONOR INTENT" 38 (Capital Research Center 1994).
236. Martin Wooster criticizes the Pew trusts as failing to respect donor intent, but at least one of
the trusts has a board controlled by Pew family members who are "very active and very involved." See
Ernest Tollerson, Charities Debate Tactic to Limit Gifts' Life Span, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1996.
237. See WILLIAM L. CARY & CRAIG B. BRIGHT, THE LAW AND THE LORE OF ENDOWMENT




INCOME ACT (UPIA) has redefined income for trust accounting purposes,
so that income now includes a portion of capital gains, at least in states that
have enacted UPIA. 238 Corporate income has always included realized
appreciation.239 In tax law, income depends on a realization event, and then
complex rules detail whether a receipt is taxable income or not.2
40
In 1972, the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) promulgated
UMIFA.241 UMIFA created a spending rule for endowments held by non-
profit corporations. 242 A donor can always specify the donor's intent, but
the drafters of UMIFA concluded that a donor who restricted spending to
"income" probably did not mean that the endowment could only distribute
trust accounting income. 243 UMIFA included a rule of construction to con-
strue the donor's intent.244 If a donor instructed a charity to "use only in-
come" from a gift or to hold the gift "as an endowment," then the statute
assumed that the donor meant that the charity could spend such amounts of
appreciation above the value of the dollars contributed (the "historic dollar
value" of the fund) as the charity determined to be prudent, considering the
purposes of the charity.245 UMIFA said nothing about spending income
other than appreciation, and it seems likely that a fund with no appreciation
can continue to spend interest and dividend income, even if the fund's
value drops below its historic dollar value. 246
In 2002, the ULC asked a drafting committee to consider revisions to
UMIFA.247 The drafting committee worked for four years, and the ULC
approved UPMIFA at the ULC's annual meeting in July 2006. Concerns
about the best way to protect donor intent remained a key consideration
throughout the deliberations of the drafting committee.
238. UN1F. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 102 (1997) (amended 2000).
239. See CARY & BRIGHT, supra note 237, at 27.
240. See id. at 29.
241. The UNIFORM MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT was adopted in forty-seven
jurisdictions. See A Few Facts About the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act,
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact'factsheets/uniformacts-fs-umifa.asp (last visited Mar. 15,
2010) for a list of adopting jurisdictions.
242. See UNIF. MGMT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 2 (1972) (providing for the appropriation
for expenditure of appreciation above historic dollar value, to the extent the appropriation is prudent
under the standard provided in section 6). The Act applies to funds held by nonprofit corporations and
only to trusts of which a charity is the trustee. See id. § 1(2) (defining "institutional fund").
243. Although the law did not clearly require a charity operating as a nonprofit corporation to
follow trust law, many charities assumed that trust rules applied for purposes of endowment spending.
See UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT Prefatory Note; CARY & BRIGHT, supra note 237, at
5-6.
244. UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 3.
245. Seeid. §§2,3.
246. See Advice for Not-for-Profit Corporations on the Appropriation of Endowment Fund Appre-
ciation, http://www.charitiesnys.com/pdfs/endowment.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
247. The author served as the Reporter for the Drafting Committee to Revise UMIFA.
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UPMIFA changes the rule of construction for endowment spending,
and discussions of what the rule should state generated a great deal of
comment. Some people argued that donors intend that the historic dollar
value of their gifts be protected from spending. Others argued that donors
really want to preserve the purchasing power of the gift so that the value
protected is not the date-of-gift value but a value reflecting changes in the
real value of the fund. Still others opined that donors want a fund to con-
tinue to make distributions for the purposes chosen by the donor, even if
the fund is below historic dollar value or "underwater." The drafting com-
mittee discussed and considered many views of what donors intend, nearly
all of the views stated with surprising definiteness. UPMIFA adopted a new
spending rule that directs a charity to spend the amount the charity deter-
mines to be prudent, after taking into consideration a list of factors. 248 The
new rule provides better guidance to charities about how to determine a
prudent spending amount and provides greater flexibility by allowing a
charity to continue spending even if an endowment fund has fallen below
historic dollar value. 249 UPMIFA emphasizes a charity's duty to carry out a
donor's intent, and includes reminders that UPMIFA is a default statute
that will provide direction concerning a gift only if the donor and charity do
not agree to override UPMIFA.
250
UMIFA and UPMIFA each create a rule that interprets the use of the
term "income" in a gift to an endowment. The discussions that occurred
during the drafting of UPMIFA demonstrated two points with respect to
donor intent: (1) the use of words, even in a carefully drafted document,
may not provide clear guidance on donor intent, and (2) no one rule can
accurately reflect the intent of all similarly situated donors.
E. Using Donor's Intent for Other Purposes
Donor's intent can provide a convenient tool for someone unhappy
about a charity's use of donated funds or just unhappy with the charity.
Even if a charity continues to follow the written restrictions on the use of a
gift, a family member or a person with a political axe to grind may argue
violations of donor intent.
248. UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 4 (2006).
249. Under the UNIFORM MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT, a charity could continue
spending interest and dividends even if a fund was below historic dollar value, see supra note 246, but
under the UNIFORM PRUDENT MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT, a charity with an under-
water fund can continue to invest on a total return basis while maintaining a prudent amount of spend-
ing. See, e.g., UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 4.
250. See, e.g., UPMIFA § 4(a) (the section on spending from an endowment fund, which begins:
"Subject to the intent of a donor expressed in the gift instrument .... ").
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1. Robertson v. Princeton
The Princeton case seems a prime example of this problem. William
Robertson, the donor's son and lead plaintiff in the case, served on the
board of the Robertson Foundation for many years. As late as 1991 he said
that the foundation was "achieving the kind of goals Mom and Dad would
have hoped for."' 251 The determination that Princeton had violated the do-
nor's intent came just after he lost an argument over which manager should
handle the foundation's investments. Mr. Robertson had been a member of
an investment committee that hired managers to handle the funds and then
directly supervised the managers' performance. The two other members of
the investment committee, both with professional investment experience
and both with ties to Princeton, suggested that the size of the foundation
made continued management by a volunteer investment committee prob-
lematic. These two committee members recommended moving the invest-
ment management to PRINCO, an investment company created by
Princeton to manage all of its endowed funds. The Robertson Foundation
and its investment committee would continue to oversee the management
work. Mr. Robertson argued against the decision and the board delayed the
change for a year while it considered other managers. Mr. Robertson began
the lawsuit shortly before the final board vote to move the management to
PRINCO. 252
The parties to Robertson v. Princeton settled the case, so no court
ruled on whether Princeton had violated any terms of the original gift. Al-
though some expenditures may have gone beyond the directions from the
donor (Marie Robertson, advised by her husband, Charles), it appears that
some of William Robertson's complaints had to do with his role on the
foundation board and the loss of some of his power on the investment
committee.
2. Political Purposes
Martin Wooster, a historian whose work is funded, at least in part, by
conservative think tanks,253 criticizes some of the large foundations created
251. Key Issues, http://www.princeton.edu/Robertson/about/issues (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
252. See Appointment of PRINCO, http://www.princeton.edu/robertson/about/princo/ (last visited
Mar. 15, 2010). Jennifer Berkowitz, whose North Carolina-based firm handled public relations for the
Robertson family, said two main issues led the family members to object to the way the foundation was
being run and to resort to legal action in 2002. One issue was the use of $13 million for the construction
of a building, Wallace Hall, and the other was the decision that PRINCO would manage the Robertson
Foundation money. See Don McNamara, Donor Intent the Focus of Suit, NONPROFIT TIMES, October 1,
2008, available at http://www.nptimes.com/08Oct/npt-081001-2.html.
253. Martin Wooster is a senior fellow at the Capital Research Center.
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in the first half of the twentieth century for ignoring the intent of their do-
nors.254 Mr. Wooster focuses not on written restrictions in legal documents
but on the character, personality, and philosophy of the donor as the way to
determine "donor intent. '255 Mr. Wooster's book provides interesting his-
torical details about the founders of major U.S. foundations, including Car-
negie, Ford, Pew, and Rockefeller, and then posits that because these
foundations were created by men256 who made their money through capi-
talism and strongly believed in capitalism, the projects supported by the
foundations should support capitalism and, in general, take a conservative
approach to philanthropy.
Taking his argument a step farther, Mr. Wooster argues that the "in-
tent" of the person who made the money should be honored, even if that
person did not create the foundation. Mr. Wooster notes that Margaret Sage
created the Sage Foundation using funds she had been left by her husband,
Russell Sage.257 Mrs. Sage sought advice in creating the foundation and
had those assisting her build in flexibility to deal with changes in the fu-
ture.258 Although Mr. Wooster cannot point to any direct violation of Mrs.
Sage's intent, he suggests violations of "donative intent" by noting that Mr.
Sage "would certainly have been horrified at what happened .... -259
Mr. Wooster's underlying concerns surface in his description of the
MacArthur Foundation. Mr. Wooster explains that John D. MacArthur
254. See WOOSTER, supra note 235.
255. In one case, The J. Howard Pew Freedom Trust, created in 1957, Mr. Wooster quotes specific
instructions that the trust "be used to 'acquaint the American people' with 'the evils of bureaucracy,'
'the values of a free market,' 'the paralyzing effects of government controls on the lives and activities
of people,' and 'to inform our people of the struggle, persecution, hardship, sacrifice and death by
which freedom of the individual was won.' Such 'forms of government' as 'Socialism, Welfare stateism
[and] Fascism... are but devices by which government seizes the ownership or control of the tools of
production."' See WOOSTER, supra note 235, at 38. Other trusts and foundations were created with
general instructions to do "good." For example, the Articles of Incorporation of the Ford Foundation
state that the Foundation is organized "[t]o receive and administer funds for scientific, educational and
charitable purposes, all for the public welfare .... " Articles of Incorporation of the Ford Foundation,
http://www.fordfound.org/pdfs/about/Charter Articles of lncorp.pdf(last visited Apr. 10, 2010).
256. Women created a couple of the foundations Mr. Wooster describes, but in his book he focuses
on the intent of the men who made the money used to fund the foundations. In writing about Robertson
v. Princeton, Mr. Wooster describes the gift as having been made by Charles and Marie and then dis-
cusses what Charles Robertson wanted "with his donation." With respect to the Robertson Foundation,
Wooster does not mention the intent of either Marie, who owned the stock used to make the gift, or
Marie's father, who made the money. See Martin Morse Wooster, Robertson v. Princeton-Who Really
Won? MINDING THE CAMPUS, Dec. 11, 2008,
http://www.mindingthecampus.conoriginals/2008/12/robertson-v-princeton.html.
257. See WOOSTER, supra note 235, at xi.
258. See id. (quoting Joseph J. Thorndike, Jr., an historian who wrote about Russell Sage).
259. Mr. Wooster briefly discusses the Buck Trust, a fund created by Beryl Buck when she died.
Mr. Wooster notes that "only one percent of [Beryl Buck's] wealth is to go to a cause that her father
favored." Id. at 51-53. The suggestion again is that the intent of the person donating the money is of
less concern than that of the person who originally earned the money.
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created his foundation "without instructions on how his wealth should be
used. '260 Mr. Wooster then complains about the foundation's failure to
honor Mr. MacArthur's "intent." Mr. Wooster describes the MacArthur
Foundation as a "Bastion of Liberalism"'261 and decries the fact that Mac-
Arthur "genius awards" go primarily to liberals and only occasionally to
conservatives. 262 In attempting to draw inferences as to Mr. MacArthur's
intent, Wooster notes that Mr. MacArthur "was a champion of free enter-
prise" who argued with his son, Rod MacArthur, a liberal.263 Despite the
quarrels, Mr. MacArthur named Rod as one of five board members when
the senior MacArthur created the Foundation.264 Mr. Wooster may be cor-
rect about Mr. MacArthur's personal political views, but ascribing these
views to the foundation, when Mr. MacArthur did not, carries no legal
weight and may not accurately reflect Mr. MacArthur's intent for the foun-
dation.
Mr. Wooster is even more direct about his political agenda in an arti-
cle written shortly after the Robertson settlement. Mr. Wooster writes:
Conservatives tend to support donor intent, as they feel that the general
law of foundations is that conservatives tend to make fortunes and liber-
als tend to seize the wealth conservatives made to fund their own agenda.
Liberals tend to oppose donor intent, as they tend to think that donors get
in the way of their efforts to spend inherited wealth on causes they pre-
fer.265
Mr. Wooster ignores Princeton's argument that it had honored donor
intent and that the plaintiffs were the ones attempting to undermine that
intent. 266 Mr.Wooster assumes that he knows what a donor intended and
that others who interpret the intent, whether the donee or even the donor's
own child as in the MacArthur Foundation example, are wrong.
F. Donor's Intent Under the Law
Mr. Wooster's book highlights the question of where to look for do-
nor's intent. Mr. Wooster traces the money and then looks at the personal
260. Id. at 35.
261. Id. at 36.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 33-36.
264. Id. at 35.
265. See Wooster, supra note 256.
266. See Key Issues, supra note 251; Settlement Retains Princeton's Control, supra note 31 (stating
Princeton's position that the Robertson family had tried, through the lawsuit, to redirect Robertson
Foundation assets to purposes other than those agreed to by the donor); Settlement Agreement, supra
note 6, at 5, 7 (explaining that assets held by Princeton will be administered based on its interpretation
of the donor's intent and that assets held by RFGI, the foundation controlled by the plaintiffs, will be
administered based on the Robertson family's interpretation of that intent).
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philosophy of the person who made the money. 267 Charity law looks in-
stead to the documents executed at the time of the gift.2 68 Susan Berresford,
former president of the Ford Foundation,269 one of the foundations Mr.
Wooster criticizes, has argued that the Ford Foundation does carry out the
intent of its donor, as expressed in the Foundation's charter. 270 Henry Ford
created the Ford Foundation with a broad mission to make "advances in
human welfare. ' 271 Ms. Berresford points out that "[t]he donor had total
freedom as to how to write that charter.... [a]nd what later generations of
people ascribe to that donor may or may not be correct. But what is abso-
lutely clearly correct is what the donor said when he or she wrote the char-
ter."
2 72
V. MODIFICATION OF DONOR RESTRICTIONS
A. Donor Consent
Under UPMIFA, a charity and a donor can agree to release or modify
a restriction imposed by a donor.273 UPMIFA applies to institutional funds
held by charities organized as nonprofit corporations. 274 If the donor of a
gift subject to UPMIFA can be located, the charity and the donor can agree
on how to modify to the terms of the gift. Under UMIFA the ability to
modify is uncertain. UMIFA provides that if the donor agrees, a charity can
release a restriction,275 and if the donor cannot be found the charity can
request that the court release the restriction.276 However, UMIFA does not
provide for modification, except to say that UMIFA "does not limit the
application of the doctrine of cy pres."277 A provision that provides for
release but not modification makes no sense because a donor would nor-
267. See also Robert H. Bork, Interpreting the Founder's Vision, THE PHILANTHROPIC PROSPECT 9
(1993) ("[E]ven where a donor has not made his intentions explicit, it will usually be possible, perhaps
within a wide range but a range nevertheless with limits, to determine from his life and activities what
uses he would not approve.").
268. The UNIFORM PRUDENT MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT states explicitly that
only written documents control. UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 2(8) (2006).
For gifts not subject to the Act, written documents provide the best evidence of intent.
269. Ms. Berresford was President of the Ford Foundation when she made these comments.
270. Tollerson, supra note 236.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 6(a).
274. See id. § 2(5).
275. UNIF. MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 7(a) (1972).
276. Id. § 7(b) (stating that the charity can apply to the court if the donor's consent "cannot be
obtained by reason of his death, disability, unavailability, or impossibility of identification . .
277. Id. § 7(d).
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mally prefer to modify a restriction than to release it altogether.278
UPMIFA changes this provision, permitting release or modification of a
restriction if the donor agrees and clarifying the application of cy pres and
deviation. Trust law does not permit a donor and a charity to modify the
trust without a court proceeding. 279 Donor-agreed modification also does
not apply to program-related assets held by nonprofit corporations.
280
If a charity needs to change a restriction on a gift subject to UPMIFA,
discussing the contemplated change with the donor is not only the easiest
way to effectuate a legal modification, but getting the donor's approval also
makes sense from a donor relations standpoint. Unfortunately, with respect
to many gifts, by the time the charity needs to modify a restriction, the
donor may no longer be alive. Modification with donor consent works only
if the donor can consent, and the right to consent to modification does not
pass to a spouse or descendants unless the gift agreement provides for that
outcome. A different problem arises with multiple gifts made to a single
fund. For example, a university may establish a scholarship fund to honor a
professor or graduate who died. If the fund receives many donations, each
of those donors would have to consent to a modification. Contacting doz-
ens or even hundreds of donors will likely be impossible, especially if the
need for modification arises years after the gifts.
B. Cy Pres and Deviation
Charitable trusts can continue in perpetuity,281 and modifications of
original trust terms may become necessary over time. For this reason, trust
law developed the doctrines that permit a court to modify a restriction im-
posed on assets held in a charitable trust. Under carefully limited circum-
stances, the doctrines of equitable deviation and cy pres permit
modification of administrative terms or the purpose, respectively, of a
278. See Yale Univ. v. Blumenthal, 621 A.2d 1304 (Conn. 1993). In this case, Yale sought the
release of a restriction that directed that a fund be used to build a wing on the Yale Medical Center to be
used for the care of the "sick poor." The issue decided by the court was whether the fund was an "insti-
tutional fund" governed by Connecticut's Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act. An underly-
ing issue, however, was the dissent's concern that if the Act applied then the only option for the court
would be the release of the restriction rather than a modification. Id. at 1310 (Berdon J., dissenting).
The majority opinion noted in a footnote that the Connecticut Act did not prevent the court from apply-
ing cypres. See id. at 1306 n.5.
279. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411 permits modification if the settlor and beneficiaries agree, but only
for noncharitable trusts. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411 (2004) (amended 2005). The UNIFORM PRUDENT
MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT applies to a charitable trust if the trustee is a charity, so a
trust with a charitable trustee could presumably use the modification-by-consent provision of the Act.
UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS Acr § 2.
280. UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS AT § 2(5)(A).
281. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003).
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charitable trust. Courts often apply trust law to charities organized as non-
profit corporations, and the doctrines of equitable deviation and cy pres
have applied to gifts to nonprofit corporations. 282 UPMIFA now confirms
that the doctrines apply to restrictions on funds held by charities organized
as nonprofit corporations. 2
83
1. Cy Pres
Cy pres, like most of trust law, is a default rule. A donor can specify
what should happen to a gift subject to a purpose restriction if the purpose
either is completed or becomes impracticable for the charity. Alternatively,
a donor can agree to allow the charity to find a new purpose if the one
specified becomes impossible. If a donor's agreement with the charity does
not provide for what should happen when changed circumstances affect a
purpose restriction, cy pres permits a court to modify the restriction, under
certain circumstances. 284 A court can modify a restriction that has become
illegal, impossible, or impracticable, and, in states that have adopted the
UNIFORM TRUST CODE (UTC), wasteful. 285 Courts have tended to apply cy
pres narrowly, giving significant deference to donor intent.
The common law doctrine of cy pres requires a finding that the donor
had a general charitable intent before a court can apply cypres.286 If a court
does not find a general charitable intent, the property reverts to the do-
nor.287 Courts typically find general charitable intent, and the doctrine then
assumes that the donor would not want the donor's intent to be frozen in
time but rather would want the intent to be modified and used for another
charitable purpose. Cy pres ties the modification to the donor's intent, and
a modification should be "as near as possible" to the original purpose.
288
282. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413 cmt.
283. See UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 6(b) (cy pres) and § 6(c) (devia-
tion). The Act does not apply to program-related assets. UNIF. PRUDENT MGMT. OF INSTITUTIONAL
FUNDS ACT § 2(5)(A).
284. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67. Numerous law review
articles analyze the doctrine. See, e.g., Atkinson, supra note 169; Evelyn Brody, Charitable Endow-
ments and the Democratization of Dynasty, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 873, 877 (1997) [hereinafter Charitable
Endowments]; Johnny Rex Buckles, When Charitable Gifts Soar Above Twin Towers: A Federal In-
come Tax Solution to the Problem of Publicly Solicited Surplus Donations Raised for a Designated
Charitable Purpose, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1827, 1834-37 (2003).
285. The common law formulation of the doctrine permits the application of cy pres if the original
purpose has become impossible or impractical or illegal. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399
(1959). The UNFORM TRUST CODE added wasteful. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413. States that have adopted
§ 413 of the UNIFORM TRUST CODE will have this additional ground for applying cypres.
286. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399.
287. See id. at cmt. i.
288. The term probably derives from Norman French: cypres commepossible -as near as possible.
The Restatement suggests that courts can be relaxed in applying the "as near as possible" test. See
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The UTC deletes the requirement that a court find general charitable
intent.289 By making this change the drafters of the UTC did not intend to
undermine donor intent but rather recognized the fact that donors who
make charitable gifts usually do have a general charitable intent.290 The
UTC also changed the language of modification, directing a court to apply
the funds "in a manner consistent with the settlor's charitable purposes."'291
Again, the question is not whether to comply with a donor's intent but how
best to do so, given the changed circumstances.
Arguments about the correct application of cy pres typically have both
sides arguing their positions based on donor intent. In the Buck Trust case,
changed circumstances affected the trustee's ability to carry out the terms
of the trust. 292 The trustee asked the court to apply cy pres to modify the
geographical restriction imposed on the trust, enlarging the restricted area
from Main County to the five counties that make up San Francisco. The
Attorney General initially agreed with the trustees but then changed posi-
tions, arguing against cy pres.293 The court refused to apply cy pres, stating
that the restriction had not become impracticable and that the modification
would do harm to the donor's intent. The court made other changes to the
trust, including removing the San Francisco Foundation as trustee and des-
ignating certain charitable beneficiaries. The court treated these changes as




The doctrine of equitable deviation or deviation permits a court to
make changes to administrative terms of a trust.295 Deviation is described
as furthering donor intent, because a court uses the doctrine to modify a
restriction when continued compliance with the restriction will impair the
accomplishment of the donor's intended purpose. The UTC permits a court
to modify an administrative or dispositive term of a trust if, "because of
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. d ("courts have recognized (as does the rule of this Sec-
tion) that the substitute or supplementary purpose need not be the nearest possible but one reasonably
similar or close to the settlor's designated purpose, or 'falling within the general charitable purpose' of
the settler.").
289. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413.
290. Id. § 413 cmt.
291. Id. § 413(a)(3).
292. See supra text accompanying notes 61-67.
293. JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 109 (3d ed. 2006).
294. Estate of Buck, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 442, 444 (Ct. App. 1994).
295. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412 (2004) (amended 2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66
(2003).
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circumstances not anticipated by the settlor, modification or termination
will further the purposes of the trust."' 296 A charity can also ask the court to
modify an administrative term "if continuation of the trust on its existing
terms would be impracticable or wasteful or impair the trust's administra-
tion."' 297 The distinction between a purpose restriction and an administra-
tive restriction may not be as clear as the doctrines of cy pres and deviation
suggest. In 1869, Ebenezer Woodward died and left property to the town of
Quincy, to found a school for girls. 298 His will provided that the school was
"for the education of females * * * who are native born, born, I wish it to
be understood, in the town of Quincy, and none other than these, to be al-
lowed to attend this Institute . ,,299 In the 1960s, the school had financial
difficulties due to insufficient numbers of Quincy-born girls attending the
school, and the school requested modification. The court applied the doc-
trine of deviation to allow non-Quincy born girls to attend the school, fill-
ing spots not taken by Quincy-born girls. 300 The court determined that Mr.
Woodward's primary purpose was to create a school for girls and that the
modification would make continued operation of the school possible.
301
Had the court determined that the geographical restriction was central to
the donor's purpose, as the court did in Buck, then the court might not have
permitted modification under cy pres.
The Barnes Foundation case demonstrates the use of deviation to per-
mit a modification that seems to go against the donor's intent.302 In Barnes
the court agreed to a sweeping set of changes: moving the gallery and art to
downtown Philadelphia, lifting restrictions on public access and social
gatherings, changing the structure of the board of trustees so that the trus-
tees Dr. Barnes had chosen would lose control, giving positions on the
board of trustees to representatives of the museums Dr. Barnes disliked,
and providing that the trustees could amend the bylaws without court over-
sight, thus making further changes without any protection for donor intent
easier. 303 The modifications solve the financial problems faced by the Bar-
nes Foundation, but the changes fairly clearly conflict with donor intent.
304
296. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a).
297. Id. §412(b).
298. See Dartmouth Coll. v. City of Quincy, 258 N.E. 2d 745, 747 (Mass. 1970).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 752-53.
301. Id. at 750.
302. See supra text accompanying notes 42-60.
303. See In re Barnes Foundation, No. 58,788, 2004 WL 2903655, at *1 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas
Dec. 13, 2004); Eisenstein, supra note 42, at 1752-53.
304. See Schwartz & Serbaroli, supra note 54 (noting that the ruling to permit the Barnes Founda-
tion to move is "[p]erhaps the strongest reason donors have been given to worry" about whether chari-
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In agreeing to the changes, the court used equitable deviation rather
than cypres.305 Deviation permits a court to make an administrative change
rather than a change that affects a purpose restriction imposed by the donor,
and the court need not find that the restriction has become "impractica-
ble. '306 In the Barnes Foundation case, however, the court's view that the
deviation was the "least drastic modification" necessary to keep the Foun-
dation operating 307 has raised questions. A candidate for the office of At-
torney General of Pennsylvania, John Morganelli, criticized the
incumbent's support for the move. He argued that by refusing the fight the
move, Attorney General Corbett failed to "fulfill his responsibilities to
represent the public interest when it comes to charitable trusts. ' 308 Mr.
Morganelli worried that the failure to protect Barnes' intent would discour-
age other donors from making charitable gifts, and he pledged to reopen the
Barnes case if elected. 309 He lost the election, so plans for the move will
continue.
C. Small, Old Fund Modification Without Judicial Approval
UPMIFA includes a new provision that permits a charity to apply cy
pres on its own, after notice to the Attorney General, but without going to
court.310 The new provision only applies to a fund that is old (more than
twenty years) and small (less than $25,000), and tracks the rules of cy
pres.311 The restriction to be modified must be unlawful, impracticable,
impossible to achieve, or wasteful, and the charity must use the fund, after
modifying the restriction, "in a manner consistent with the charitable pur-
poses expressed in the gift instrument.
'312
ties will carry out their wishes); see also Leslie Lenkowsky, A Risky End to the Barnes Case: Can
Donor Intent now Survive in Pennsylvania?, WSJ.com Opinion Journal, Dec. 16, 2004.
305. Curiously, the court cited to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 381 (1959) rather than to
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 (2003). See Barnes Foundation, 2004 WL 2903655, at *19
n.13.
306. Pennsylvania had not adopted the UNIFORM TRUST CODE at the time the court heard the
Barnes case, so the changes the UNIFORM TRUST CODE makes to the application of cy pres and devia-
tion did not apply.
307. Barnes Foundation, 2004 WL 2903655, at *19.
308. Press Conference, available at
http://www.bamesfriends.org/downlload/J.%2OMorganelli%2OStatement%20on% 2 0the%20Bames% 2 0
Foundation.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2010).
309. Id.
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VI. DONOR REACTIONS
A. Non-perpetual Foundations
In response to concerns that foundations wander from the vision of the
founder, some philanthropists now choose to establish foundations that will
last for a limited time, so that the donors can have direct control over
spending decisions. Aaron and Irene Diamond created a foundation with a
gift of $200 million and planned to spend the entire amount over a ten-year
period. 313 The foundation terminated at the end of 1996, on schedule and
while Irene Diamond was still alive. 314 Other examples include the Lucille
P. Markey Charitable Trust, which spent $506 million in fourteen years,
and the Jacobs Family Foundation, which will terminate on the death of the
last to die of the founder's three children.315
The most famous current example of a foundation with an intention-
ally limited lifespan is the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. That foun-
dation, created in 2000 and now with an endowment valued at $33.5
billion,316 will spend its money and terminate within 100 years. 317 Al-
though Bill and Melinda Gates themselves will not likely be alive when the
foundation terminates, they do not want the foundation to extend long into
the future. Their hope is that the foundation will tackle and solve a number
of big problems and can do so in 100 years. Future philanthropists can ad-
dress the problems of the future.
Donors often articulate two advantages in operating their foundations
on a short-term, or at least non-perpetual, basis. A foundation operating for
a fixed period of time can remain under the control of the founder or the
next generation of family members.318 In addition, by making grants more
313. See Tollerson, supra note 236.
314. Id.
315. Id. The foundation should continue to last about three decades.
316. See Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation Fact Sheet,
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/about/Pages/foundation-fact-sheet.aspx (last visited Mar. 16, 2010).
The Gates Foundation website indicates that the amount includes the gifts made to the foundation in
2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 by Warren Buffett.
317. See Letter from Bill and Melinda Gates, http://www.gatesfoundation.org/about/Pages/bill-
melinda-gates-letter.aspx (last visited Mar. 16, 2010).
318. See Andy Hoffman, Peter Munk's Golden Rule, THE TORONTO GLOBE AND MAIL, Apr. 12,
2008 (saying about Munk, "[a]n unabashed political conservative, he bristles at the thought of his cash
being doled out by 'left-wing bureaucrats' once he's gone."); see also Charitable Endowments, supra
note 284, at 894 (discussing difficulties with perpetual endowments and pointing out that "[a] perpetual
charity, however, must eventually be carried out by persons other than the founder. Sometimes lost in
the veneration of perpetual charities is the very real mortality of the human beings who constitute them.
Donors, trustees, directors, and officers-as well as the beneficiaries and clients-all come and go, as
fate and circumstances dictate. The various players making up 'the charity' have their own, possibly
diverging, interests.").
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quickly a foundation may be able to have a greater impact on the causes it
hopes to further.319 Peter Munk, an eighty-year-old Toronto philanthropist,
adds a third advantage, that donors should have the pleasure of seeing the
results of their giving. Munk says, "I think the money should be spent in
front of the founder. Otherwise it becomes a bureaucratic thing and loses
the excitement. Furthermore, I love being involved. Isn't that half the
fun?" 320
B. More Stringent Donor Restrictions
A donor upset about a charity's failure to follow the donor's intent
with respect to a gift may respond by imposing more stringent restrictions
on subsequent gifts. Paul F. Glenn was so incensed by what he saw as the
University of Southern California's misuse of the funds he had contributed
that he brought suit against the university. 321 Following the resolution of
the lawsuit, Mr. Glenn continued to make charitable gifts but "put his bene-
ficiaries on a short leash"322 by creating carefully structured contracts to
govern the gifts and then keeping a careful eye on the charity's use of the
money.323
Mr. Glenn's personal experience affected his approach to charitable
donations. For other donors, general concern about lack of respect for do-
nor intent may result in greater restrictions. Shortly after the court in
Herzog refused to grant standing to the donor to sue the University of
Bridgeport over failure to comply with a restriction imposed on a gift,324 a
newspaper reported the view voiced by some advisors that the ruling would
"prompt donors to structure their gifts more carefully. '325 The increases in
donor restrictions that have been observed in recent years may come in part
from the entrepreneurial backgrounds of donors, but may also be affected
by "an emerging belief that institutions need to be scrutinized more
closely."326
In the aftermath of the Robertson v. Princeton settlement, some com-
mentators opined that donors should tighten restrictions they impose on
319. See Tollerson, supra note 236.
320. See Hoffman, supra note 318.
321. See Stephanie Strom, Donors Add Watchdog Role to Relations with Charities, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 29, 2003, at A8; Greg Winter & Jonathan Cheng, Strings Attached: Givers and Colleges Clash on
Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2004.
322. Winter & Cheng, supra note 321.
323. Id.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 211-13.
325. Arenson, supra note 169.
326. Winter & Cheng, supra note 321.
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gifts. Martin Wooster suggested that the case "may well send a signal to
other donors to be extremely wary of the gifts they make to colleges and
universities. '327 Mr. Wooster advises those making gifts to universities to
avoid perpetuity and to "make their wishes as explicit as possible. '328
Frederic Fransen, president of Donor Advising, Research & Educational
Services, a donor organization, wrote in an op-ed for the Pittsburgh Trib-
une-Review that "donors must take care to spell out their intentions clearly
and establish protocols for monitoring the money's use and recovering
funds if it is misused."
329
VII. DRAFTING CONSIDERATIONS AND STRATEGIES
Donors want to support charitable causes and donees want the support
of donors. Both donors and donees have strong incentives to develop a
clear understanding of the intended projects. Any agreement has to be ac-
ceptable to both donor and donee. A donor will not want to cause undue
burdens for the donee, and the donee will not want to disappoint the donor
or the donor's family by being unable or unwilling to carry out the donor's
wishes. The next section discusses some strategies that lawyers represent-
ing either the donor or the donee may find helpful. This section also in-
cludes some cautions about the type of legal representation that may be
counter-productive to the intent of donors.
A. Clear Statement of Intent
A gift agreement that states, as clearly as possible, the mutual under-
standing of the donor and donee may help prevent future disagreements. A
clear statement of intent need not try to pin down every possible contin-
gency or try to direct decisions the charity will need to make to carry out
the project envisioned. Stringent donor restrictions may not serve either the
donor or the donee well, and an advisor should seek a balance between an
adequate explanation of the donor's wishes and sufficient flexibility to
cope with changes over time. A charity must be able to exercise discretion
in giving effect to donor intent.
330
327. See Wooster, supra note 256.
328. Id.
329. Frederic J. Fransen, Op-Ed., Robertson v. Princeton-A Post-Mortem, PITrSBURGH TRIBUNE-
REVIEW, Jan. 4, 2009, available at
http://www.pittsburghlive.corm/x/pittsburghtrib/opinion/s_605481 .html.
330. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 124, § 410 Rptr. Notes 1. The ALl Principles provide that a char-
ity will be deemed to have complied with a terms in a gift instrument "if the charity reasonably imple-
ments all material requirements of the term .... See id. § 430. The ALl Principles recognize that some
level is discretion is necessary.
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As a response to the problems with funds collected after September
11, the Red Cross took steps to clarify the purposes for its appeals and cre-
ated a better process to establish donor intent.331 In October 2005, the Red
Cross's homepage urged visitors to donate to the Disaster Relief Fund,
332
perhaps because the Red Cross expected donations in connection with the
two hurricanes, Katrina and Rita, that had caused widespread problems that
fall. In January 2009, the website does not highlight any recent disasters,
and the homepage simply includes a link labeled "donate. '333 That page
lists five general funds, including the Disaster Relief Fund, and provides
descriptions of each fund. A donor chooses a fund before continuing with
the online donation process. The new web design should help to clarify
donor intent and make it easier for the Red Cross to administer the funds it
receives.
B. The Costs of Stricter Restrictions
More stringent donor restrictions can be detrimental to charities in a
number of ways, and if restrictions hamper the work of the donees, the
restrictions may also adversely affect the donors' goals. If most donors
restrict their contributions to a specific project or program, the amount of
unrestricted money may be insufficient to take care of the charity's existing
needs.334 As more donors choose restricted over unrestricted gifts, money
to support operating expenses and general program expenses becomes
harder to find.335 The fewer restrictions placed on funds received by a char-
ity, the greater flexibility the charity will have in meeting its operating
costs, developing new programs, and managing all of its funds in an effi-
cient manner.
331. See Red Cross Announces New Disaster Fundraising Practices,
http://www.charitywire.com/charityl 5/02840.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2010).
332. American Red Cross, www.redcross.org (last visited Oct. 1, 2005). Near the top of the web-
page was the following: "Help the victims of the recent hurricanes and thousands of other disasters
across the country each year by making a contribution to the American Red Cross Disaster Relief
Fund." (emphasis in the original). Two links on the webpage stated: "Disaster Relief Fund
2005/Hurricane Katrina Relief Donors" and "Hurricane Season 2005 - donate to the Disaster Relief
Fund."
333. American Red Cross, www.redcross.org (last visited Feb. 1, 2009).
334. Andrea Muirragui Davis, Designated Gift-Giving Frustrates United Way: Earmarked Funds
on the Rise, INDIANAPOLIS BusiNEss JOURNAL, Sept. 13, 2004 (reporting the United Way of Central
Indiana's inability to make the grants it wanted to make, despite increased donations, due to an increas-
ing number of restricted gifts).
335. See Strom, supra note 321 (quoting Art Taylor, president and chief executive of the Better
Business Bureau's Wise Giving Alliance as saying, "Restricted gifts are nice, but what organizations
need is money to build and support their own infrastructure, and that is increasingly hard to come by.").
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Increased donor restrictions, described as a "more muscular style of
philanthropy, ' 336 also create costs for charities. A charity may incur costs if
the charity needs to create additional internal financial controls to comply
with a donor's desire for increased monitoring and reporting. 337 To the
extent that more restrictions lead to more enforcement questions, a charity
may incur legal fees. 338 The fundraising process itself can become more
complicated and more costly. A charity may spend more time with a par-
ticular donor, developing an agreement that protects both the donor and the
charity. As donors increase the level of oversight, charities are also paying
more attention to gift agreements. A charity will want to avoid future dis-
putes with a donor over compliance with the gift agreement and will want
to clarify the level of power a donor can have to limit unrealistic expecta-
tions. 339 The increased donor concern about protecting the donor's intent
has resulted in "some really hairy gift agreements. '3
40
A final problem with greater restrictions may seem counterintuitive,
but may in fact be of concern. If a donor and charity work together to spec-
ify in great detail the terms of a gift, perhaps they can avoid future misun-
derstanding. At the same time, specificity reduces flexibility for charities.
Minor changes in circumstances, easily addressed when a donor expresses
a more general intent, may lead to the very misunderstandings the donor
and charity wished to avoid. The restrictions may prevent the charity from
using donated resources in the most efficient manner possible, in keeping
with its donors' general intent.
Given the concerns of William Robertson and his sisters, should a
lawyer representing Marie, or Marie and Charles together, have drawn the
Robertson Foundation restrictions more narrowly? Several reasons suggest
that the restrictions as drafted accomplished the goals of both the donor and
the donee. First, the restrictions as drafted reflect the intent of the donor at
the time of the gift. Any second-guessing now, over forty years later, may
misrepresent the donor's actual intent. Second, the flexibility provided in
the Certificate of Incorporation allowed the graduate program at the Wood-
row Wilson School to grow into a program Charles Robertson described,




339. See Winter & Cheng, supra note 321.
340. Strom, supra note 321 (quoting Janet P. Atkins, chief executive of Philanthropic Advisers).
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tion, as "first-rate."' 341 Marie and Charles Robertson seem to have gotten
the results they wanted. Third, Princeton might not have accepted the gift
had the restrictions been drawn too narrowly. 342 A university will be un-
willing to consider donor restrictions that infringe on academic freedom by
permitting a donor to make decisions about faculty hiring or curricular
development. 343 And if the Robertsons had kept control of the foundation,
as Frederic Fransen suggested they should have done,344 Princeton would
not have undertaken the expansion of the Woodrow Wilson School.
345
To demonstrate the problems that may result if a donor insists on spe-
cific gift restrictions with no flexibility for how the charity will carry out
the proposed project, imagine a hypothetical gift agreement drawn along
the lines of William Robertson's view of his parents' intent. The restriction
might have said, "money from the Robertson Foundation will be used to
train graduate students who agree to accept employment in foreign service
jobs with the U.S. government. ' 346 To that end, "money can be used to hire
professors to instruct those students, but only to hire professors appointed
solely by the Woodrow Wilson School (not sharing an interdisciplinary
appointment with another school at Princeton), who are government affairs
practitioners. '347 Given what we know of the donor's intent from the Cer-
tificate of Incorporation and other public documents, this restriction would
not have carried out Marie's intent (or Charles' intent, for that matter).
First, Princeton would not have agreed to a major expansion of the graduate
program under these terms. 348 As an academic institution, Princeton must
have the ability to make decisions about its curricula and its faculty and
cannot allow donors to control those decisions. 349 The scope of the pro-
341. See Key Issues, supra note 251 ( "In 1977 ... Charles Robertson wrote that he 'never had
cause for regret' that his wife had provided support for the Woodrow Wilson School, which he de-
scribed as 'first rate' and 'doing an outstanding job."')
342. See Bjorklund, supra note 3, at 3 (explaining that the gift agreement, documented in the
Certificate of Incorporation, reflected negotiations between the donor and the donee).
343. See id. at6, 10.
344. See Fransen, supra note 329 ("The mistake they [the Robertsons] made was giving Princeton
control of that foundation."). Gift and income tax deductions also depended on Princeton's control.
345. See Myers Memorandum, supra note 7, at 1-2.
346. See Complaint, supra note 7, at 3 (describing the mission of the Foundation as "to train gov-
ernment servants with particular emphasis on international affairs"); Bjorkland, supra note 3, at 3-4
(citing Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment re: Fiduciary Duties and Business Judgment Rule at 2, Robertson v. Princeton Univ. No. C-
99-02 (July 17, 2002) for the proposition that the graduate program had failed in its mission "of recruit-
ing, preparing and placing professional career government employees").
347. See Bjorklund, supra note 3, at II (describing plaintiffs arguments about the type of faculty
that should be training the graduate students).
348. See Myers Memorandum, supra note 7, at 2.
349. See Bjorklund, supra note 3, at 10-12 (discussing the importance of academic freedom and
academic abstention).
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gram would have been much smaller-perhaps a few scholarships for
graduate students-and the Woodrow Wilson School would not have
grown in renown as it has. Had the donors expressed such a narrow view of
their proposed project, their gift would have not been nearly as successful
in training graduate students, building a world-class faculty who contribute
to academic knowledge, and developing a school that serves as a resource
to the government and the country. 350 Flexibility benefits both the donor
and the donee.
C. Standing for Donor
Under the common law, only the state Attorney General has standing
to enforce a charitable gift.351 The Attorney General acts on behalf of the
public and may view the duty as protecting the intent of the individual do-
nor, promoting charitable bequests by ensuring that charities do not ignore
restrictions placed on gifts, and ensuring that assets in the charitable stream
continue to benefit the public. The third purpose on this list can sometimes
be at odds with the first-protecting the intent of an individual donor-
because the public may benefit if a restriction is lifted. However, protecting
donor intent can benefit the public indirectly by encouraging, and not dis-
couraging, future gifts.
Although the Attorney General may enforce donor intent, the Attorney
General may choose not to investigate a case when a donor alleges that a
charity has violated a restriction. Most offices have limited staff devoted to
working with charitable issues and typically do not have the ability to in-
vestigate every complaint.352 Even if the Attorney General makes an initial
inquiry, the Attorney General then exercises discretion in determining
which cases to bring. Thus, a donor may have a concern that will not be
addressed by the Attorney General.
Although states permit standing by persons with a "special interest" in
the issue, courts have interpreted "special interest" so narrowly that private
persons can rarely obtain standing because of a special interest.353 States
may permit a private person to act on behalf of the Attorney General, as a
relator, but relator status is rarely sought.354 New York has permitted per-
350. For a description of the success of the graduate program at the Woodrow Wilson School, see
id. at 3-5.
351. Iris J. Goodwin, Donor Standing to Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil Society Vs. Donor Em-
powerment, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1136 (2005).
352. See Gary, supra note 152, at 1317.
353. MARION FREMONT SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE
LAW AND REGULATION 328-34 (2004).
354. Id. at 325.
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sons with special interests in a fund to bring a suit. In Alco Gravure, Inc. v.
Knapp Foundation,355 the court granted standing to a successor corporation
and two individual beneficiaries to enforce a restriction that required that
funds be distributed to needy employees of the corporation. In Smithers v.
St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital Center,356 the court granted standing to the
special administrator of the donor's estate, appointed for the purpose of
bringing the suit. However, neither the special interest doctrine nor oppor-
tunities for relators are widely used and both are fact specific. Thus, neither
can be relied on at the planning stage.
The UTC provides that a settlor of a charitable trust has standing to
enforce a trust.357 The UTC defines "charitable trust" to include a portion
of a trust, so a donor to a charity organized as a charitable trust would have
standing to enforce a restriction on a gift made by that donor.358 Courts
have sometimes applied trust rules to charities organized as nonprofit cor-
porations, so the UTC rule may eventually apply to nonprofit corporations.
A donor in Missouri recently argued "that because common law charitable
trust principles have often applied to charitable corporations, newly enacted
statutes addressing only charitable trusts must also apply to charitable cor-
porations. '359 The court determined that the Missouri UTC is limited to
charitable trusts and the court could not construe the statutory language to
apply a UTC rule on standing to a nonprofit corporation.360 The court noted
that UPMIFA, also a new statute and one that focuses on nonprofit corpora-
tions, is silent with respect to donor standing. The court then refused to
extend standing to a donor of a nonprofit corporation. 361
A court's finding of standing is fact specific. A donor may seek to "re-
serve standing" for the donor, the donor's estate, or the donor's descen-
dants by including a provision in the gift agreement giving any or all of
them the power to enforce the gift. In some of her gift agreements Victoria
B. Bjorklund includes a provision in which the donee charity agrees not to
challenge standing if the donor, the donor's estate or the donor's descen-
dants sue the charity. Ultimately, the court has the authority to decide
whether any party has standing in a case, but usually the court will not
dismiss a party unless another party challenges standing. No reported case
355. 479 N.E. 2d 752 (N.Y. 1985).
356. 723 N.Y.S.2d 426 (App. Div. 2001).
357. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(c) (2004) (amended 2005).
358. Id. § 103(4).
359. Hardt v. Vitae Found., Inc., No. WD 70525, 2009 WL 3734190, at *4 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 10,
2009).
360. Id. at *3.
361. Id. at *4.
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has tested this type of provision, but the provision may protect standing in a
legally correct way. 36
2
D. Contingent Remainder to Another Charity
Given the difficulty of providing for standing for the donor and the
possibility that a problem may arise well into the future when the donor is
no longer alive, another strategy to make enforcement of a restriction more
likely is to name another charity as a contingent beneficiary. The gift
agreement could provide that if Charity A fails to carry out the restriction,
then Charity B takes the gift. For example, if the restriction is a conserva-
tion easement imposed on a piece of real property, naming Charity B as the
contingent beneficiary could mean that Charity B would monitor the use of
the property. With real property, monitoring whether Charity A has sold or
improperly developed the property would be relatively easy to do.
A gift of money to be used for a particular purpose will be more diffi-
cult to monitor. As long as Charity A holds the gift in a separate fund, de-
termining the amount subject to the contingency is possible. The more
difficult logistical problem is whether Charity B will know if Charity A has
violated a restriction. Charity A might be less interested in the gift if the
agreement required providing reports to Charity B, and Charity B might be
uncomfortable in the role of monitoring Charity A. Nonetheless, on certain
facts, a contingent beneficiary might be an effective way to protect a re-
striction.
E. Mediation
The donor and charity can try to explain their intentions clearly in the
gift agreement, but because changes will occur over time, they could also
agree to a process for resolving any disputes that arise later. A clause could
require that both sides engage in mediation in good-faith and could provide
a process for choosing a mediator. 363 If the donor and charity want to in-
clude a mediation clause in the agreement, they will need to decide who in
addition to the donor would be able to request mediation. The question will
be how far to extend the clause-to the donor's estate, the donor's spouse
or partner, the donor's children, or the donor's descendants. Although the
362. Conversation with Victoria Bjorklund, lawyer representing Princeton Univ. in Robertson v.
Princeton Univ., in N.Y. (Sept. 19, 2008).
363. Fred Hopengarten recommended the idea of using of alternative dispute resolution in an email
to the author. Mr. Hopengarten suggested that ADR could be "a way to resolve family disputes without
breaking the bond of trust that could yield later gifts to the charitable institution." Email from Fred
Hopengarten (May 13, 2009) (on file with author).
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donor may want to extend the right to descendants as long as any descen-
dants exist, the charity and the donor may agree to some time limit on the
right to request mediation.
A charity and a donor may prefer to include a provision that either
side could request an arbitration proceeding. The clause could provide for
how an arbitrator would be chosen and the circumstances under which
arbitration could be used. Arbitration may provide better protection for a
donor, because without the threat of litigation, a charity might fail to par-
ticipate in a meaningful way in mediation. Because a donor lacks standing
to enforce a restriction, an agreement to arbitrate a dispute that arises would
provide the donor with some assurance that his or her wishes will be given
effect as specified in the gift agreement.
F. Collaboration
The lawyer's role, on either side, is to protect the interests of the cli-
ent, but the donation of a charitable gift should not be an adversarial proc-
ess. A lawyer representing a charity should remember that the charity
wants to encourage donor giving but that the charity should not compro-
mise its mission in accepting a gift with too many restrictions. A university
must be careful not to compromise its academic freedom: the right to con-
trol "who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who
may be admitted to study. '364 Another type of charity may need to be care-
ful about accepting a gift that will overwhelm the other parts of the char-
ity's mission or accepting a gift that will otherwise adversely affect the
mission.
A lawyer representing a donor should understand the donor's wishes
and work with the charity to draft an agreement that explains any restric-
tions on the gift as clearly as possible. The lawyer must review the lan-
guage of the gift agreement carefully, to avoid any unexpected
interpretations. The lawyer can also explain to the donor the benefits of
building some degree of flexibility into the agreement, so that the charity
can respond to changing conditions in an effective and efficient manner,
consistent with the donor's overarching charitable purpose. Flexibility may
mean that the charity can avoid a future court proceeding to modify an
unworkable restriction, and the funds that would otherwise be spent on
legal fees will be available for charitable purposes the donor favors. If the
donor has specific interests, such as dog welfare, the donor's lawyer should
364. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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not create so much flexibility that the charity can ignore the donor's pur-
pose.365
G. Conservation Easement Amendment Clauses
366
Conservation easements provide an example of a flexible approach to
the long-term administration of charitable assets, but one that also requires
state Attorney General and court oversight of any fundamental change in
the donor's charitable purpose. Many conservation easements are conveyed
as charitable gifts to charitable conservation organizations (typically re-
ferred to as "land trusts). A landowner donating a conservation easement
will be eligible for a federal charitable income tax deduction only if, among
other things, the easement is "granted in perpetuity," the conservation pur-
pose of the easement is "protected in perpetuity," the easement is transfer-
able only to another holder that agrees to continue to enforce the easement,
and the easement is extinguishable (other than through condemnation) only
in what essentially is a cypres proceeding.
367
In its recently published report on conservation easement amend-
ments, the Land Trust Alliance (an umbrella organization for over 1,700
land trusts) recommends that land trusts negotiate with easement donors for
the flexibility to amend conservation easements consistent with their stated
charitable conservation purposes and memorialize that grant of discretion
in the easement deeds in the form of an "amendment provision." 368 The
typical amendment provision grants the holder of a conservation easement
the power to agree to amendments that further, or are not inconsistent with,
the charitable conservation purpose of the easement.369 In some cases,
landowners may wish to customize the standard amendment provision to
preclude the holder from agreeing to amend the easement to permit certain
activities on the property (such as to increase the level of residential devel-
opment permitted on the property).370 In the event a landowner refuses to
grant a land trust the type of broad amendment discretion found in the stan-
dard amendment clause, the land trust can simply refuse to accept the
365. See supra text accompanying notes 228-36 (discussing the Helmsley Charitable Trust).
366. The author thanks Nancy A. McLaughlin for her assistance with this section.
367. Nancy A. McLaughlin & W. William Weeks, In Defense of Conservation Easements: A
Response to The End of Perpetuity, 9 WYO. L. REV. 1, 78-79 (2009) (discussing the federal tax law
requirements); see also UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 2 cmt. (1981); UNIF. TRUST CODE
§ 414 cmt. (2004) (amended 2005); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 7.11 (2000).
368. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, AMENDING CONSERVATION EASEMENTS, EVOLVING PRACTICES AND
LEGAL PRINCIPLES, RESEARCH REPORT 31 (2007).
369. McLaughlin & Weeks, supra note 367, at 43-44.
370. Id. at 45.
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easement, or it can accept the easement knowing that its ability to amend
absent attorney general and court involvement will be more circumscribed.
The Land Trust Alliance's recommendation that land trusts negotiate for
amendment provisions "reflects a... recognition that land trusts should not
bind themselves to enforcing restrictions in a conservation easement deed
that might, over time, conflict with the conservation purpose of the ease-
ment and the land trust's basic conservation goals."
'371
H. Examples
1. Donor-Restricted Fund as Part of the Presbyterian Foundation
The Presbyterian Foundation has posted online an agreement that can
be used by a donor to create a permanent fund as part of the Presbyterian
Foundation's endowment fund. 372 The donor designates a beneficiary or
beneficiaries (only "Presbyterian or Presbyterian-Related Charitable Bene-
ficiaries") 373 who will receive the "Net Income" from the fund.374 The
agreement defines net income to include "all amounts calculated pursuant
to any distribution policies authorized by applicable state law, '375 and the
agreement provides that Pennsylvania law applies. 376 The donor can indi-
cate restrictions in the section in which the donor names the beneficiary for
the fund. The agreement defines restrictions as a charitable purpose speci-
fied by the donor, including the description and use of distributions and any
conditions that must be met before distributions can be made.377 A "restric-
tion" can also indicate that distributions can include amounts additional to
"net income. '378
This Presbyterian Foundation agreement focuses heavily on the rights
of the charity and the process for making the gift. Extensive sections dis-
cuss different types of property that a donor may use to make a gift and the
applicable date of gift for each. 379 The agreement gives the foundation
control over investment policy and investment decision-making, as well as
the right to take a fee for the investment work.380
371. Id. at 47.
372. Presbyterian Foundation Permanent Fund Application and Agreement (on file with author).
373. See id. atV, p. 8.
374. Seeid. atl.A,p. 1.
375. See id.
376. Seeid. atl.A,p. 3.
377. See id. at l.A, p. 2.
378. Seeid. atI.A,p. 1.
379. See id. at 1, IV, VI, pp. 2, 3 7, 9.
380. See id. at I.B, p. 2.
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The Presbyterian Foundation agreement permits a donor to restrict the
purpose of the gift, but the form gives the foundation sole authority to
make decisions about modifications that may be needed. If a restriction
becomes "illegal, indefinite, impractical or impossible to perform or fulfill,
the Foundation may amend such Restriction to have a purpose which paral-
lels, to the extent possible, the original intent of the Donor, and may elimi-
nate the Restriction if the original intent of the donor cannot be
fulfilled."'381 The foundation makes the decision on its own, after consulta-
tion with the appropriate governing bodies of the Presbyterian Church.3
82
Presumably the foundation could consult with the donor or surviving fam-
ily members, but no part of the form directs the foundation to do that.
The agreement does not feel donor-friendly, but it may not need to be.
A potential donor either accepts the terms or makes a gift in a different
way. In exchange for the foundation's agreement to manage the fund in
perpetuity, the donor accepts the foundation's rules.
The agreement relies on Pennsylvania law to govern distributions,
rather than create its own spending rules. The spending rules in the agree-
ment will not be clear to a typical donor, who will not likely know Penn-
sylvania law on the subject. Again, the document feels one-sided. Donors
benefit from the management ability of the charity, and in turn, the charity
benefits from the gifts, without being truly bound by the restrictions.
2. Carroll College Scholarship Fund
Carroll College, in Montana, uses a straightforward form for a donor
to use in creating a scholarship fund.383 The Memorandum of Understand-
ing (MOU) allows the donor to name the fund, to specify criteria for selec-
tion of the scholarship recipient, and to indicate who will make the
selection. The MOU provides that if a need for the fund no longer exists, at
some time in the future, the college can "select an appropriate use for this
fund which will come as near as possible to fulfilling the wishes of the
Donors." The MOU does not provide rules on investing or distributing
from the fund, so Montana's UPMIFA will govern the fund in those aspects
of management.
This form does a good job of covering the basics. The donor can pro-
vide some direction in the use of the fund, but the college retains the right
to redirect the fund if the designated need no longer exists. The MOU does
381. Seeid.
382. See id.
383. Carroll Montana, Memorandum of Understanding (on file with the author).
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not say who determines whether a need for the fund still exists, and
whether, if a need no longer exists, the college must continue to hold the
fund as a separate fund for a different use or can commingle the fund with
other assets. The donor must rely on the college's good faith effort to find
another appropriate use, but for a gift of this sort, the agreement does a
good job of balancing the interests of the donor and the college.
3. UC Irvine's School Naming Gift Agreement
A form posted by UC Irvine would be used for a large gift, one large
enough to entitle the donor to have a building named for the donor.384 This
form, as one would expect, contains provisions outlining the purposes in-
tended by the donor and the university and addressing possible future is-
sues.
One section of the agreement describes the purpose or purposes for
each portion of the gift. The form uses a description of a $20 million gift as
an example, and the example demonstrates good balance between specify-
ing intent and providing flexibility. Parts of the gift create three endow-
ments, one for faculty positions, one for graduate fellowships, and one for
undergraduate scholarships. The donor designates the school or department
for eligible recipients, and the dean of that school controls the number of
awards and the criteria. The gift description then provides two current-use
funds, one to be used in the dean's discretion, and one for special projects,
also determined in the discretion of the dean. For this $20 million gift, $15
million will go to the three endowed funds, and $5 million will go to the
two current-use funds. Thus, some funds will continue in perpetuity, but
the school will be able to use some funds as needed.
The section titled "Administration of Endowment," explains how the
university will manage and distribute the endowments and by making those
rules part of the gift agreement, makes UMIFA or UPMIFA spending rules
inapplicable to the funds. 385 The university will invest the funds on a total
return basis and then distribute the amount determined under its spending
rate. The agreement indicates that information about the university's in-
vestment and disbursement policies have been provided to the donors.
384. University of California, Irvine, Gift Agreement to Name the Donor(s) Name(s) Project at the
School/College of , available at
http://www.supportingadvancement.com/potpourri/sample-gift-agreement/sample-giftagreement.pdf
(last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
385. California adopted UNIFORM PRUDENT MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT in the
fall of 2008. The agreement refers to historic dollar value and the rules that would have applied under
the UNIFORM MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT, in force when the university drafted the
form.
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Thus, the donors understand how the university manages the funds and
how the university determines the amount to distribute from each endow-
ment. The agreement makes clear that spending can continue, even if the
value of the fund drops below the fund's historic dollar value. The agree-
ment also notes that the university's standard administrative fees will ap-
ply.
Finally, a section called "unforeseeable circumstances" provides as
follows:
In the unlikely event that, at some future time, it becomes impossible for
any of the categories specified above for the gift to serve the specific
purpose for which they were created, the Chancellor shall direct that the
principal and income from any of these categories be devoted to pur-
poses that are deemed to be the most consistent with the wishes of the
Donors and, if possible, in consultation with the Donors or their heirs.
This paragraph provides for the possibility that a purpose will become
impossible to achieve, and reassures the donors that any new purposes will
be the ones "most consistent with the wishes of the Donors" and that the
donors, if alive, or if not, their heirs,386 will be consulted. The university
can make the needed changes without going to court, but the university will
consider the donors' wishes, to the extent doing so is possible.
The UC Irvine Gift Agreement provides an example of an agreement
that balances the needs of the university for control of its academic func-
tions (naming the professors to hold chairs, for example) with provisions
that protect the wishes of the donors. The agreement contains both specific-
ity and flexibility, and provides rules to avoid unnecessary legal costs if
changed circumstances make a change in the purposes necessary. Argu-
ments could arise about whether a restriction has become impossible, what
purposes are most consistent with the wishes of the donors, and to what
extent the Chancellor must consult with the donors, but with reasonable
good faith on both sides, the agreement represents a reasonable compro-
mise for the charity and the donor. Although lawyers like to try to pin down
anything that could go wrong later, sometimes planning for every contin-
gency is not feasible. In this case, permitting the university to modify a
386. "Heirs" may create an interpretation problem, because a donor's heirs are determined at the
donor's death, and the impossibility problem and resulting need for consultation may arise after the
subsequent deaths of the donor's spouse or children (most likely to be heirs) or the donor's siblings (if
the donor had no spouse or children). Someone using this form might want to indicate more precisely
who would be consulted. A spouse would certainly be appropriate, if the spouse were not one of the
donors, and perhaps descendants rather than heirs. Limiting consultation to one generation-children-
might also be appropriate and might be sufficiently reassuring to the donor. Of course, the provision is
limited to situations in which consultation is "possible" so pinning down the persons to be consulted
may not be necessary.
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restriction may be in the best interests of the donors as well as the univer-
sity, assuming good faith on the part of the university.387
VIII.CONCLUSION
All of the problem areas identified in this paper have one thing in
common-the fact that donor intent is more elusive than the politicians and
lawyers sometimes remember. A donor can try to be specific in a gift
agreement, and donors increasingly want to spell out their restrictions.
However, even the most specific agreement may not address future changes
in every circumstance. Other donative situations may provide limited in-
formation about the intent of a particular donor. And in some situations, a
charity may decide that not accepting a gift is preferable to carrying out a
purpose that interferes with the mission of the charity.
Although the focus is often on donor intent, the donee-charity's role in
carrying out the donor's wishes is important. Gift agreements for large gifts
typically represent the end-result of negotiations between the donor and the
donee. The charity's intent, and the charity's promises in the gift agree-
ment, must be considered when trying to determine the donor's intent.
Charities need donor money, but a charity must be mindful of its mission
and should not accept gifts with strings that will strangle the charity and
prevent the organization from doing its work. Also, charities must be able
to adapt to changing circumstances over time. Stringent restrictions im-
posed by a donor may seem sensible at the time, but years later the charity
may not be able to meet those restrictions due to changes external to the
charity. Some flexibility, and trust in the charity, will better ensure that the
donor's charitable interests will be met over the long-term.
If the donor and the charity have a clear understanding of the terms of
a gift, later problems may be avoided. If a gift is large, both donor and
donee should have legal counsel. 388 If a donor refuses professional advice
and chooses to rely on the charity's own lawyers in preparing a gift agree-
ment, the charity should document all communications with the donor.389
From a legal standpoint, perceived intent cannot be enforced. From a
practical and political standpoint, however, perceived intent can become an
387. A lawyer for the donor might recommend against reliance on the university's good faith
because a few charities have been known to disregard the interests of a donor. However, the alternative
is to require the approval of the attorney general or a court, and obtaining that approval will divert
money from the charitable purposes the donor favored.
388. See THE CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHROPY, p. 37 (Mar. 31, 2005) (quoting Jeff Comfort, senior
planned planned-giving adviser at Georgetown University).
389. See id.
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argument that influences decision-making. The difficulty is, of course, that
perceptions vary depending on the goal of the person "perceiving" the do-
nor's intent. For this reason some wealthy donors now create foundations
or charitable gift funds that will terminate either before or shortly after the
donor dies. Other donors are willing to leave a foundation or a charitable
donee with a flexible charge, knowing that future generations will need that
flexibility to deal with changing circumstances.

